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INTRODUCTION

COVID-19’s impact has drawn calls for renewing and re-thinking
public education in New York and elsewhere. On May 5, 2020, New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced a plan to “reimagine
education” 1 with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 2 The
announcement drew a swift and largely negative reaction from parents,
teachers, education advocates, and local elected officials3 who viewed
it as an especially thoughtless approach, given the stark and deadly
inequities the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed.4 A few days earlier,
on April 29, 2020, Chancellor of the New York State Board of Regents
Betty Rosa announced the establishment of a task force of educational
leaders to guide the reopening of the State’s schools. 5 Her
announcement noted “how schools across the state serve as the
cornerstone of our communities” and emphasized the importance of

1. See Video, Audio, Photos & Rush Transcript: Amid Ongoing COVID-19
Pandemic, Governor Cuomo Announces Collaboration with Gates Foundation to
Develop a Blueprint to Reimagine Education in the New Normal, N.Y. ST.:
GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (May 5, 2020) [hereinafter Video, Audio, Photos &
Rush
Transcript],
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/video-audio-photos-rush-transcript-amid-ongoingcovid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomo-announces-19 [https://perma.cc/ZHC3-6CJH].
2. See Peter Greene, Why Bill Gates Is Not the Man to Reimagine New York
FORBES
(May
8,
2020,
4:04
PM),
Education,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergreene/2020/05/08/why-bill-gates-is-not-the-man-to
-reimagine-new-york-education/#685c2ce079cc [https://perma.cc/J9PT-RSQR]; see
also Valerie Strauss, Cuomo Questions Why School Buildings Still Exist — and Says
New York Will Work with Bill Gates to ‘Reimagine Education,’ WASH. POST (May 6,
2020,
3:42
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/05/06/cuomo-questions-why-schoolbuildings-still-exist-says-new-york-will-work-with-bill-gates-reimagine-education/
[https://perma.cc/943F-B6ZX].
3. See Rachel Sandler, Cuomo Faces Backlash for Enlisting Billionaires Eric
Schmidt and Bill Gates to ‘Reimagine’ NY After Reopening, FORBES (May 6, 2020,
7:09
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/05/06/cuomo-faces-backlash-for-enlis
ting-billionaires-eric-schmidt-and-bill-gates-to-reimagine-ny-after-reopening/#342327
8a5592 [https://perma.cc/J4HE-KNYG].
4. See Jenni Fink, School Closures Due to Coronavirus Could Widen Education
Inequality Among Students, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 25, 2020, 3:59 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/school-closures-coronavirus-inequality-education-gap-wi
dens-1494303 [https://perma.cc/22A8-W46Q].
5. See Press Release, New York State Educ. Dep’t, Statement from Chancellor
Betty A. Rosa, the Board of Regents and Interim Commissioner Shannon Tahoe (Apr.
29,
2020),
http://www.nysed.gov/news/2020/statement-chancellor-betty-rosa-board-regents-and-i
nterim-commissioner-shannon-tahoe [https://perma.cc/T4QY-MMP3].
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including school-based stakeholders and emphasizing equity in any
plan for re-opening or re-thinking public education.6
The stark disparate impact of COVID-19 on communities of color
and low-income communities is well documented.7 These disparities
mirror deep, longstanding structural inequity along the lines of race,
ethnicity, and class. 8 To reimagine public education in light of the
experience and lessons of COVID-19, policymakers must meaningfully
include the voices and perspectives of marginalized communities most
impacted from the start. This must occur within and beyond
appropriate public education governance structures.
This Article considers the imperative to “reimagine education” in
New York. It does so from the perspectives of equity and democratic
governance, as reimagining public education is a quintessentially public
and democratic endeavor. Part I of this Article describes COVID-19’s
impact on New York City public schools, and what the crisis revealed
about the role of public schools in communities across the City. Part II
examines the New York Governor’s and Board of Regents’s reopening
and reimagining proposals, taking into account the history and
structure of education law and policymaking in New York City. This
Part includes the backdrop of education governance in New York and
takes account of recent New York education reforms emphasizing
privatization and market-based models that have failed to improve
quality or equity in New York City public schools. It considers the
interplay of education and public health governance involving federal,
state, and local actors. Against these backdrops, this Article considers
the Governor’s and Board of Regents’s approaches and proposals.
Part III contends that to effectively combat deep inequities, any reexamination of public education, particularly in light of COVID-19,
must begin with a careful examination of the facts and input from the
people most affected — not from billionaires. Such reimagining also
must take place within accessible, transparent, and inclusive public
6. See id.
7. See MAKE THE RD. N.Y., EXCLUDED IN THE EPICENTER: IMPACTS OF THE
COVID CRISIS ON WORKING-CLASS IMMIGRANT, BLACK, AND BROWN NEW YORKERS 4
(2020),
https://maketheroadny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/MRNY_SurveyReport_small.
pdf [https://perma.cc/K3YQ-SFA8]; see also Monica Webb Hooper, Anna María
Nápoles & Eliseo J. Pérez-Stable, COVID-19 and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, JAMA
(May
11,
2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2766098
[https://perma.cc/E3LJ-9KAP].
8. See Lois Parshley, The Deadly Mix of Covid-19, Air Pollution, and Inequality,
Explained,
VOX
(Apr.
11,
2020,
8:50
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/4/11/21217040/coronavirus-in-us-air-pollution-asthma-blac
k-americans [https://perma.cc/3JZK-8C39].
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structures and spaces. It considers early responses to the COVID-19
pandemic as a lens through which to examine various school
governance structures, including single purpose versus general
purpose, centralized versus decentralized, as well as the impacts of
privatization and federal involvement. This Article concludes with
observations about the current proposals and recommendations for
community-inclusive approaches that foreground equity and
community inclusion as essential to the success of any public school
innovation or reimagination.
This Article discusses how New York City public schools planned to
reopen in the fall of 2020, given the COVID-19 crisis, and what
educators and elected leaders charged with school governance consider
when closing and reopening schools to support public health and
address and alleviate the stark inequities the pandemic exposed and
exacerbated. This Article also explores who should decide the terms
and, moreover, what theories and methods of leadership and
governance might best respond to the stark social and educational
inequities that the pandemic revealed and worsened.
I. NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL INEQUITIES AND
COVID-19’S IMPACT
A. Existing Inequities in New York City Public Schools

New York City public schools are separate and unequal; 9 indeed,
they are among the most segregated in the country.10 Despite New
York City’s reputation as a progressive city, stark socioeconomic
inequality is longstanding and is reflected in the makeup and resources

9. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kornblau, Separate But (Still Un)Equal: Challenging
School Segregation in New York City, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 644–45 (2019)

(“[T]he New York City school system is segregated along economic and racial lines.
One highly regarded study, known as the UCLA Study, noted that New York City,
despite being one of the most diverse cities in the United States, has one of the most
racially and socioeconomically segregated school systems in the country.”); Nikole
Hannah-Jones, Choosing a School for My Daughter in a Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES
(June
9,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/magazine/choosing-a-school-for-my-daughter-in
-a-segregated-city.html [https://perma.cc/Z3CK-PFZT]; Sweta Vohra, Episode 16:
‘Segregated
City,’
N.Y.
TIMES:
WKLY.
(Dec.
8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/the-weekly/nyc-schools-segregation.html
[https://perma.cc/GE72-KTEZ].
10. See Madina Toure, NYC Has the Most Segregated Schools in the Country.
How Do We Fix That?, OBSERVER (June 14, 2018, 5:03 PM),
https://observer.com/2018/06/new-york-city-public-school-segregation/
[https://perma.cc/BJ2N-79UJ].
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of its public and private schools. 11 Two-thirds of Black and Latinx
students attend schools that are predominantly (80% or more) Black
and Latinx.12 “Half of NYC’s schools are at least ninety percent Black
or Latinx, while Black and Latinx students comprise only about sixtyseven percent of the City’s public school population.”13
Segregation in New York City public schools tends to track
socioeconomic inequality — significant disparities in educational
quality and access exist based on race and class, 14 significantly
impacting the education opportunity gap between Black and Latinx
versus white (and some Asian-American) students.15 Notably, school
segregation in New York City worsened following the implementation
of choice- and market-based school policies and practices during the
Bloomberg Administration.16
Segregated schools, particularly those in isolated areas of
concentrated poverty, correlate with negative educational
opportunities and outcomes. They tend to have higher teacher
turnover, less experienced teachers, and less access to quality facilities,
books, technology, and resources necessary for educational success.17

11. See JOHN KUCSERA & GARY ORFIELD, C.R. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS
CIVILES, NEW YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY,
INACTION AND A DAMAGED FUTURE, at vi, 22–24, 89–93 (2014),
https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/n
y-norflet-report-placeholder/Kucsera-New-York-Extreme-Segregation-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/737G-NTUE].
12. See CITIZENS’ COMM. FOR CHILD. OF N.Y., KEEPING TRACK OF NEW YORK
CITY’S
CHILDREN:
2020,
at
31–32
(2020),
https://cccnewyork.org/data-publications/keeping-track-of-new-york-citys-children-20
20/ [https://perma.cc/FYB5-FWQ7] (stating that of nearly 1.4 million students
attending schools in New York City, most attend one of the Department of Education’s
1,800 public and charter schools. The rest attend private schools, which are
disproportionately white).
13. Andrea Alajbegović, Still Separate, Still Unequal: Litigation as a Tool to
Address New York City’s Segregated Public Schools, 22 CUNY L. REV. 304, 306
(2019) (footnotes omitted).
14. See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and

Income Segregation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of
Legal Infrastructure and the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 319, 322
(2015).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 322–23 (citing KUCSERA & ORFIELD, supra note 11, at 22).
17. See id. at 323.

2021] REIMAGINING PUBLIC EDUCATION EQUITY 319
B. The COVID-19 Pandemic Caused School Closures Across
New York City

In either late 2019 or early 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak arrived in
the United States as it swept across the rest of the world.18 New York
City soon became a pandemic’s epicenter, with cases rising sharply in
March 2020.19 This prompted Governor Cuomo to suddenly close the
City’s economy on March 22, 2020, and shut down New York City
public schools — the nation’s largest public school system — earlier on
March 16, 2020.20 New York City teachers and school leaders were
given one week to prepare for distance learning. Online classes for
New York City’s 1.1 million public school students began on March 23,
2020, and continued through the end of the 2019–2020 school year.
C. COVID-19 Exposes and Exacerbates Inequities Among
New York City Public School Students

Almost immediately following school closures and the shift to online
learning, shortcomings and inequities emerged.21 Concerns were not
limited to struggles with ensuring teaching and learning in an online
environment. The multivariate importance of public schools to
communities and society quickly came to the fore. For example, school
leaders immediately recognized the importance of public schools in
supporting children facing food insecurity. 22 The New York City
Department of Education (DOE) arranged for families to pick up

18. See Mike Baker & Sheri Fink, Covid-19 Arrived in Seattle. Where It Went from
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
6,
2020),
Stunned
the
Scientists.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-sequencing.html
[https://perma.cc/DS2Z-FEXP].
19. See Jesse McKinley, New York City Region Is Now an Epicenter of the
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
22,
2020),
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22/nyregion/Coronavirus-new-York-epicenter.html
[https://perma.cc/WU5L-CFV8].
20. See Corina Knoll & Matthew Sedacca, Parents Scramble as N.Y.C. Schools
Close
over
Coronavirus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/nyregion/nyc-schools-closed-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/EGY6-SRWA].
21. See Selim Algar, NYC Education Dept. Rolls Out Remote Learning for One
Million
City
Kids,
N.Y.
POST
(Mar.
23,
2020,
7:24
PM),
https://nypost.com/2020/03/23/nyc-education-dept-rolls-out-remote-learning-for-onemillion-city-kids/ [https://perma.cc/3XJV-AQ22].
22. See Collier Meyerson, NYC’s School Closures Are a Crisis of Their Own for
Disadvantaged
Families,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Mar.
21,
2020),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/nycs-school-closures-are-a-crisis-for-low-inco
me-families.html [https://perma.cc/T36W-LAUP].

There
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meals at school buildings across the city.23 The shift from in-person to
online, remote teaching and learning depended on a technological
infrastructure that many students and families lacked, exposing the
extent of a pre-existing “digital divide.”24 This included not only access
to computers, laptops, iPads, or other hardware but also internet and
Wi-Fi access and home environments conducive to online classes and
homework. 25 Despite significant adaptive efforts by teachers,
principals, and school leaders, public school closures and the move to
remote learning exposed and exacerbated stark inequities in schooling
for New York City children and families as well as many of their
teachers.26
The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare and further fueled the negative
impacts of double segregation and inequality in New York City public
schools.
It unshrouded, for example, housing inequities, the
importance of and disparities in teacher-student relationships, and
longstanding inequities for English Language Learners (ELLs) and
students with disabilities.

i. Digital Divide
One of the most readily notable inequities revealed in the move to
remote learning is the so-called “digital divide.”27 A 2019 New York

23. See Sophia Chang, NYC Plans to Feed All Students, Deliver Laptops for
Remote
Learning,
GOTHAMIST
(Mar.
16,
2020,
4:02
PM),

https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-plans-feed-all-students-deliver-laptops-remote-learni
ng [https://perma.cc/JX7G-YT8S].
24. See Pia Ceres, A ‘Covid Slide’ Could Widen the Digital Divide for Students,
WIRED
(Aug.
7,
2020,
7:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/schools-digital-divide-remote-learning/
[https://perma.cc/KW9A-C6Y3].
25. See Tom Liam Lynch, Distance Learning Didn’t Need to Be This Hard: NYC
Schools Failed to Lay the Groundwork for a Transition, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27,
2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-distance-learning-this-hard-20200327xgrb52fwpjglxk4imfjjmuzitq-story.html [https://perma.cc/D5QJ-TW7E] (stating that
some observers charged that the New York City DOE had failed to lay the groundwork
that would allow for large scale distance education).
26. See Anna North, The Shift to Online Learning Could Worsen Educational
Inequality,
VOX
(Apr.
9,
2020,
1:10
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/4/9/21200159/coronavirus-school-digital-low-income-stude
nts-covid-new-york [https://perma.cc/C98B-XVDT].
27. See NYC’s Digital Divide: 500K Households Have No Internet Access When
It Is More Important Than Ever Before, CITIZENS’ COMM. FOR CHILD. N.Y. (Apr. 24,
2020)
[hereinafter
NYC’s
Digital
Divide],
https://www.cccnewyork.org/blog/new-york-citys-digital-divide-500000-nyc-household
s-have-no-internet-access-when-it-is-more-important-than-ever-before/
[https://perma.cc/3V9K-6K78].
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City Comptroller Report found that “nearly one-third of households
lack access to broadband internet at home” — approximately 30% of
Hispanic and Black New Yorkers, compared to 20% of White and 22%
of Asian New Yorkers.28
This digital divide exists across the country. In 2019, 21.3 million
people lacked access to broadband connections.29 Overall, low-income
families tend to be more smartphone dependent and lack multiple
internet-enabled devices, such as laptops or iPads. School-age children
are among those most affected by this lack of access, with 35% of their
households lacking broadband service in 2015. 30 The digital divide
impacts distance education’s availability and effectiveness. The
disproportionate number of school-age children without home
broadband access has become clear as schools struggled to substitute
in-school resources with online instruction, electronic libraries,
streaming videos, and other online tutorials.31
These disparities in access took on a new urgency as schools shifted
to emergency distance learning. As New York City Schools Chancellor
Richard Carranza noted, we “cannot talk about remote learning
without acknowledging that there is a technology gap that exists among
our school communities.”32 Amid New York City’s shift to distance
learning, Carranza announced plans to distribute an estimated 300,000
tablets or laptops (devices) and noted in late March 2020 that 175,000
devices had been delivered, with the remainder to be distributed in
coming weeks.33 However, by mid-April, nearly 20,000 students who

28. OFF. OF N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, CENSUS AND THE CITY:
OVERCOMING NYC’S DIGITAL DIVIDE IN THE 2020 CENSUS 4–5 (2019),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Census_and_The_City_O
vercoming_NYC_Digital_Divide_Census.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTS5-2F4E].
29. See Nicol Turner Lee, What the Coronavirus Reveals About the Digital Divide
Between Schools and Communities, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 17, 2020),
http://brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/03/17/what-the-coronavirus-reveals-about-th
e-digital-divide-between-schools-and-communities/ [https://perma.cc/R38D-HSX2].
30. See id.
31. See Annie McDonough, Remote Learning Challenges Will Likely Continue in
New
York,
CITY
&
ST.
N.Y.
(Aug.
30,
2020),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/education/remote-learning-challengeswill-likely-continue-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/DS7K-KK4N] (“[W]hile the
existence of high-speed internet infrastructure isn’t lacking as much in New York City,
high prices mean that roughly 1.5 million New Yorkers don’t have a home or mobile
broadband connection.”).
32. Nikita Stewart, She’s 10, Homeless and Eager to Learn. But She Has No
Internet.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/nyregion/new-york-homeless-students-coronavir
us.html [https://perma.cc/G3B9-PVT2].
33. See id.
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had requested devices reported that they still did not have them.34 As
a result, many New York City students went weeks without consistent
access to schoolwork and fell behind their peers.35
COVID-19 brought into sharp relief existing disparities in internet
access in New York City. During this time, more than 500,000
households (roughly 800,000 people) in New York City lacked internet
access — including broadband, dial-up, satellite, or cell phone data
plans.36 Recently, the New York City Mayor’s Office estimated the
number of New Yorkers lacking a home or mobile internet connection
at 1.5 million people.37 Lack of internet connectivity significantly limits
access to critical financial and food supports, education, and health
services for some of the City’s most vulnerable people. Households
lacking internet access are most prevalent in low-income
neighborhoods with high rates of poverty.38 In several neighborhoods,
such as northern Manhattan and the Bronx, only one internet service
provider (ISP) is available for households, further limiting access and

34. See Alex Zimmerman & Jessica Gould, Nearly 20K NYC Students Still Missing
Promised
iPads,
CITY
(Apr.
26,
2020,
2:53
PM),

https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/4/26/21247083/nearly-20k-nyc-students-still-missing-pro
mised-ipads [https://perma.cc/9NFU-QTXP].
35. See id.; see also COVID-19 Affects New York City Schools, Nation’s Largest
District,
NPR
(Mar.
27,
2020,
7:22
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/27/822411665/covid-19-affects-new-york-city-schools-nat
ions-largest-district [https://perma.cc/Z5K9-3ULS].
36. See NYC’s Digital Divide, supra note 27.
37. See Universal Solicitation for Broadband: NYCHA, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF.
CHIEF
TECH.
OFFICER,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cto/#/project/usb-nycha/
[https://perma.cc/WN8Y-8CGA] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
38. See Marguerite Reardon, COVID-19 Shines Light on ‘Digital Divide’ Across
the
US,
CNET
(Mar.
18,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/covid-19-shines-light-on-digital-divide-across-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/XC38-HYSZ].
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choice.39 An estimated 46% of households in poverty lack broadband
access.40
In July 2020, Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that New York City’s
Internet Master Plan,41 initially launched in January 2020, would be
accelerated, investing $157 million to expand broadband internet to
600,000 New Yorkers — including 200,000 New York City Housing
Authority residents — over the next year and a half. 42 While a sign of
progress, the plan does not respond to the urgency of the situation —
students need immediate access to the internet to learn remotely
during the pandemic.43 The New York City DOE offered some shortterm solutions during the spring 2020 school closures, such as using
iPads as mobile hotspots and seeking low-cost internet from
providers.44 The degree to which such efforts will continue, or their
effectiveness, is unclear. Thus, the need for access to reliable internet
service for distance learning will persist and expand disparities in
educational access in New York City.

39. See N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF THE CHIEF TECH. OFFICER, THE NEW YORK CITY
INTERNET
MASTER
PLAN,
at
iii
(2020),
https://tech.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/NYC_IMP_1.7.20_FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ57-VEJ8]; see also Ryan Johnston, New York City Asks
ISPs, Technology Companies to Help Close Digital Divide, STATESCOOP (May 26,
2020),
https://statescoop.com/new-york-city-asks-isps-technology-companies-to-help-close-d
igital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/BQR5-T8ZK]. New York City has asked service
providers to “close a digital divide” as part of an Internet Master Plan that calls for
investing $2.1 billion in existing infrastructure, as well as new public and private
investment, to expand access to high-speed internet in New York City. See Colin
Wood, New York City Unveils ‘Internet Master Plan’ for Universal Broadband
Access,
STATESCOOP
(Jan.
7,
2020),
https://statescoop.com/new-york-city-internet-master-plan-universal-access-john-paul
-farmer/ [https://perma.cc/U8GH-JMP7]. It has yet to come to fruition. See id.
40. See N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFF. OF THE CHIEF TECH. OFFICER, supra note 39, at ii.
41. See id. at i.
42. See Annie McDonough, Internet Access Remains a Problem as Schools Plan
for
Reopening,
CITY
&
ST.
N.Y.
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/education/internet-access-remains-pro
blem-schools-plan-reopening.html [https://perma.cc/Q6E3-3FDS].
43. See id.
44. See Michael Elsen-Rooney, 300,000 NYC Education Dept. iPads Will Now
Function as Internet Hotspots, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2020, 4:57 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/education/ny-ipad-hotspots-doe-nyc-2020081
4-nk45ni6cy5arhcxbphz2icg7u4-story.html [https://perma.cc/67PW-LME4].
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ii. Home Environment — from Homelessness to Doubling Up to
Second Homes
The COVID-19 pandemic’s “stay-at-home” remote work and
distance learning requirements revealed the importance of home
environments for general health and well-being, including access to
education. It also revealed wide inequities in the circumstances of
students and teachers based on housing and family conditions. For
example, some students lack internet access because they are
homeless.45 In fact, recent reports have documented record-high levels
of homelessness among New York City public school students in recent
years. 46 In New York City, an estimated 114,000 children live in
shelters or have unstable housing. 47 According to the City’s
Department of Social Services, “[t]here are about 450 shelters for
families and single adults in the main shelter system, and most of them
do not have Wi-Fi available for residents.”48 An informal survey of a
Bronx shelter residence showed that only 15 of 79 families had devices,
and there were 177 school-age children in the shelter attending more
than 100 different schools.49 This means that even the small percentage
of students who managed to get iPads or other devices for remote
learning could not access coursework and often fell behind their peers.
Additionally, the trauma and difficulties associated with experiencing
homelessness, including crowding, lack of privacy and places to study,
and day-to-day uncertainty about procuring basic needs, impact
student performance.50 For students without stable housing, school is
often one of the only constants in their lives. The unavailability of
school spaces and regular social connections compounds the myriad
crises students face amid the pandemic. Some have suggested that
policymakers and childcare specialists “should focus on creating
special shelters and housing units, potentially using hotels or empty
dorm rooms,” so school-aged youth can attend school or be
quarantined in a safe environment.51

45. See Stewart, supra note 32.
46. See Eliza Shapiro, Homelessness in New York Public Schools Is at a Record
High:
114,659
Students,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/nyregion/homeless-students-nyc-schools-record.
html [https://perma.cc/8L5E-VGGT].
47. See Stewart, supra note 32.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Rachel I. Sillman Cohen & Emily Adlin Bosk, Vulnerable Youth and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 146 PEDIATRICS, at 2 (2020).
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Even for students with reliable housing, the COVID-19 pandemic
exacerbated socioeconomic disparities and difficulties many students
and families experience. 52 State-imposed stay-in-place orders shed
light on the degree to which marginalized children, families, and
communities rely on public schools for everything from childcare, to
supplemental food, to social support. Low-income families and
families facing unemployment or furloughs because of the pandemic
experienced immediate, severe economic stressors, including food
insecurity and possible eviction. 53 Families with multiple children
faced great difficulty managing their children’s remote learning while
also working either outside the home or remotely from home while
managing the household. Even middle-class parents described
significant difficulties managing working from home while supervising
their children’s remote learning. 54 In addition, “[f]or teachers with
their own school-age children, the situation [wa]sn’t just untenable, it[]
[was] impossible.” 55 The pandemic compounded difficulties many
families already faced trying to balance work and parenting obligations
without sufficient housing, social, and economic supports.56 The need
to manage school and work in urban home environments, from
homelessness to a variety of home arrangements not suited to the task,
widened gaps in learning access.

52. See JAMES A. PARROTT & LINA MOE, NEW SCH. CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFS., THE
NEW STRAIN OF INEQUALITY: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COVID-19 IN NEW YORK CITY
1–2
(2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/5e974be17687ca34
b7517c08/1586973668757/NNewStrainofInequality_April152020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EU7-F2GM] (“Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of jobs lost to date
during the pandemic were held by workers paid less than $40,000 annually. Only 10
percent of lost jobs occurred among those paid $100,000 or more annually.”).
53. See Jeanna Smialek, Poor Americans Hit Hardest by Job Losses Amid
Lockdowns,
Fed
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/business/economy/coronavirus-jobless-unemplo
yment.html [https://perma.cc/E4LY-7V2H].
54. See Deb Perelman, In the Covid-19 Economy, You Can Have a Kid or a Job.
You
Can’t
Have
Both.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/business/covid-economy-parents-kids-career-ho
meschooling.html [https://perma.cc/A29L-B75V].
55. Id.
56. See Lynn Lu, A Nightmare of Work and Care, LPE PROJECT (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/a-nightmare-of-work-and-care/
[https://perma.cc/MU8M-6HFT].
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iii. Teacher-Student Relationships to Support Students’ Social and
Emotional Health
School closures revealed stressors on students and teachers and the
importance of robust teacher-student relationships for learning and
social and emotional health.57 Distance learning challenged teachers
to maintain connections with and support students. Students and
teachers struggled not only with schoolwork but also with sick family
members, dislocation, and other variables during remote learning. 58
Many teachers expressed concern about students with whom they had
lost connection over the spring, including health concerns, family
stresses, and worries about the availability of distance learning
infrastructure.59 Teachers noted how difficult it is to teach students
without maintaining a consistent relationship with them.
Much of the experience with remote learning during the spring and
summer of 2020 prompted calls for in-person instruction to resume as
quickly as possible. In response, and mindful of the continued
pandemic public health concerns, New York City’s Mayor and Schools
Chancellor made plans for in-person, remote, and hybrid learning in
the fall of 2020. 60 On August 6, 2020, New York City Schools
Chancellor Carranza released an update informing parents about how
to opt out of a hybrid model for an all-remote model instead.61 In the
update, Carranza stated that teachers would provide daily live
instruction for remote learners and have dedicated time during school

57. See, e.g., David Saleh Rauf, Nurturing Teacher-Student Connections in a
EDUC.
WK.
(July
22,
2020),
Virtual
World,

https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2020/07/23/nurturing-remote-learning-relationshi
ps.html [https://perma.cc/MKH5-PMPS].
58. See, e.g., Together Apart: How Teachers Are Fighting to Make Meaningful
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2020),
Connections
with
Students,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/style/teachers-students-coronavirus-help.html
[https://perma.cc/P4XU-ZDJP] (hosted by Priya Parker, available on the website).
59. See Valerie Strauss, How Relationships Between Teachers and Students Are
Being Tested in COVID-19 Crisis, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/04/22/how-relationships-between-te
achers-students-are-being-tested-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/RK9C-QBBV].
60. See Welcome to the 2020–2021 School Year, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/school-year-20-21/return-to-school-2020/welcome-to-the2020-2021-school-year [https://perma.cc/7TPE-G49L] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
61. See id.; see also Messages for Families: August 6, 2020: Update for Families on
Instruction, N.Y.C. DEP’T EDUCATION (Aug. 6, 2020) [hereinafter August 6, 2020
Update],
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/news/chancellor-s-message-for-families
[https://perma.cc/2BEM-YMT4].
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days to engage with students and families via video conference or
telephone.62
The fall 2020 hybrid in-person and remote reopening of the New
York City public schools was plagued with difficulties and uncertainty.
On August 7, 2020, Governor Cuomo announced that New York
State’s schools could reopen based on the reduction in COVID-19
transmission. 63 He left to local school districts decisions about
whether, when, and how to reopen schools.64 This meant that New
York City’s Mayor and Schools Chancellor were to decide. Mayor de
Blasio announced an ambitious plan to reopen schools with a blended
model of in-person and remote learning on September 10, 2020.65 The
Mayor’s determination to reopen was based on a combination of
concerns about the effects of school closures on student learning and
social-emotional health,66 as well as on the economy and his legacy.67
Teachers and principals unions, some parents, and advocates raised
several concerns, including school safety, adequate staffing, and
scheduling.68 School leaders had few good choices. Ultimately, New
York City public schools reopened under a staggered, blended model
mixing partial in-person and distance learning, with options for full

62. See August 6, 2020 Update, supra note 61. Noting the importance of
teacher-student relationships, Carranza highlighted potential community-building
routines such as daily morning meetings where the teacher engages students in
activities related to social-emotional wellness and community building, or daily closing
activities where the teacher recaps learning for the day. See id. As of this writing, these
plans are preliminary, acknowledging both the importance and difficulty of having
teachers establish and maintain connections with students when working remotely or
in a hybrid format.
63. See Evan McMorris-Santoro & Yon Pomrenze, New York City Schools’
Return to In-Person Classes Leaves Parents with Tough Choices, CNN (Sept. 27, 2020,
5:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/us/nyc-schools-reopening-latest/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UKZ2-FGN3].
64. See id.
65. See Sophia Chang, De Blasio Unveils Partial In-Person Learning Model for
2020–2021
School
Year,
GOTHAMIST
(July
8,
2020,
2:05
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/de-blasio-unveils-partial-person-learning-model-2020-202
1-school-year [https://perma.cc/WY9F-R84D]; McMorris-Santoro & Pomrenze, supra
note 63.
66. See Chang, supra note 65.
67. See Madina Touré & Erin Durkin, De Blasio Stakes His ‘Whole Legacy’ on
Reopening New York Schools, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2020, 11:34 AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/09/30/amid-a-spike-in-inf
ections-schools-get-off-to-a-shaky-start-1319112 [https://perma.cc/49ZT-YE5A].
68. See, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, New York City Educators Warn School Reopening
Plan
Is
‘Missing
Pieces,’
NPR
(Aug.
25,
2020,
12:02
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/25/905446306/new-york-city-educators-warn-school-reop
ening-plan-is-missing-pieces [https://perma.cc/8WLY-D4C3].
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remote learning.69 Concerns persist about the social-emotional effects
of continued remote learning for many students, as well as the effects
of repeated changes in school schedules and the specter that schools
will again be forced to close entirely should COVID-19 community
spread increase.70

iv. English Language Learners
COVID-19 exposed and exacerbated educational inequities of New
York City’s roughly 160,000 ELLs, many of whom are the children of
recent immigrants. In New York City, immigrant communities are
among the most negatively impacted by COVID-19 in terms of illness,
death, and economic loss.71 A significant proportion of New York City
immigrant households include “essential” workers72 who are required
to work outside the home or lost jobs due to pandemic-related business
closures.73 Many recent immigrants live among large families, often in
multi-generational households.74 Often, the older generations in these
households do not speak any English and have limited experience with
or limited access to technology.75 This means that many ELL students
faced greater challenges shifting to remote learning. 76 At the same
time, they lost the support of teachers and school-based services when
public schools closed and online classes began.77

69. See McMorris-Santoro & Pomrenze, supra note 63.
70. See, e.g., Rosy Chhabra & Alicia Menard-Livingston, What About Children’s

Mental Health? Constantly Shifting School Reopening Plans May Have Long-Term
Psychological Consequences, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2020, 5:00 AM),

https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-what-about-childrens-mental-health-2
0200918-civeqvspgvbxdnksav5epsulum-story.html [https://perma.cc/9FT2-BT7P].
71. See MAKE THE RD. N.Y., supra note 7, at 5.
72. See id. at 16 (“Immigrants make up a disproportionate number of New York’s
essential workers — risking their health and that of their families to care for all of us.”).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Jenny Low, For Our Most Vulnerable Families, the City Must Delay
In-Person School and Improve Remote Learning, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/9719-most-vulnerable-families-new-york-cit
y-delay-school-improve-remote-learning [https://perma.cc/E3VE-F5ZS].
75. See Rikha Sharma Rani, Imagine Online School in a Language You Don’t
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
22,
2020),
Understand,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-immigrants-school.html
[https://perma.cc/5UJY-VSJD].
76. See id.
77. See Madina Touré, English Language Learners Want Voices Heard in School
Reopening
Talks,
POLITICO
(July
30,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/07/29/english-language-le
arners-want-voices-heard-in-school-reopening-talks-1304142
[https://perma.cc/XZ27-KW5A].
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Access to in-person classes, which provide opportunities to engage
with supportive teachers, is important for all students but crucial for
ELLs.78 The move to remote learning not only forced students to rely
on remote instruction but also limited their communication with
teachers through email or scheduled remote conferences.79 Teachers,
who could receive up to 80 to 100 emails a night, found it difficult to
answer them all.80 Many ELL students keenly felt the loss of in-person
instruction because they often could not rely on help from their
parents, who were likely learning English themselves and
disproportionately worked in essential jobs. 81 Accessing translated
materials and navigating remote learning software also can be
particularly challenging for students and families for whom English is
a new language. 82 Reaching and accommodating ELLs is a central
education equity concern highlighted by and exacerbated during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Although the DOE provides web-based resources to ELL students
and families,83 several observers view these resources as insufficient to

78. See, e.g., Corey Mitchell, English-Learners May Be Left Behind as Remote
Learning Becomes ‘New Normal,’ EDUC. WK. (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:30 PM),

https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/learning-the-language/2020/03/coronavirus_english_
learners_digital_divide.html [https://perma.cc/8XH5-Y63D].
79. See Shumita Basu & Reema Amin, For NYC’s 135,000 Students Learning
English, Remote Education Comes with Steep Barriers, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 20, 2020,
4:46
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/for-nycs-135000-students-learning-english-remote-educati
on-comes-with-steep-barriers [https://perma.cc/H56R-9MAV].
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., Parents’ Survey Identifies Key Needs for New York Families
Navigating New Reality, GLOB. STRATEGY GRP. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://s3-us-east-2.amazonaws.com/edtrustmain/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/04/0
7121352/Coronavirus-Parent-Poll.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD52-5W5W].
83. See
Multilingual
Learners,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/learning/multilingual-learners
[https://perma.cc/B9NS-AKJU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Multilingual Learners and
English
Language
Learners,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/learning/learn-at-home/activities-and-supports/multiling
ual-learners-and-english-language-learners [https://perma.cc/D37M-FYDZ] (last
visited Nov. 1, 2020). The DOE’s website provides information and advice to
immigrant families on how to support their children’s learning at home. See id. It
includes tips on accessing e-books in different languages, preparing children for college
and careers, and strategies to help children with remote learning. See id. The DOE also
directs parents to a translation phone line that has over 350 languages to help families
understand school communications. See id. However, these well-intentioned resources
are not sufficient to meet students’ needs. There is deep concern among parents,
educators, and advocates that learning loss among ELL students will increase
significantly because of remote learning.
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address the needs of multilingual learners and their families. 84
Recognizing these challenges, advocates called on school leaders to
improve the DOE’s remote learning approach for ELL students,
including stronger communication with ELL families, more bilingual
school social workers and guidance counselors, and leveraging ELL
experts and lessons from other states to implement the best possible
practices in remote ELL instruction.85

v. Students with Disabilities
Students with disabilities also have been severely affected by
COVID-19, school closures, and the shift to remote learning. Out of
New York City’s 1.1 million students, roughly 228,000 children have
disabilities.86 These students are at the greatest risk of learning loss
and developmental setbacks during school closures because they miss
out on small-setting classrooms and vital supports — such as speech,
occupational, and physical therapy — that are nearly impossible to
provide virtually. 87 Because the law requires schools to provide
students with disabilities a free appropriate education on terms equal
to those provided to the general student population, school leaders
must find ways to support students with disabilities during the
pandemic.88 However, many educators and parents take the position
that “even if remote learning were executed perfectly, students with

84. See, e.g., Advocates Unveil a Comprehensive Plan to Address Educational
Equity for Multilingual Learners/English Language Learners and Multilingual
Families During the Pandemic, N.Y. IMMIGR. COAL. (May 7, 2020),

https://www.nyic.org/2020/05/advocates-unveil-a-comprehensive-plan-to-address-edu
cational-equity-for-multilingual-learners-english-language-learners-and-multilingual-f
amilies-during-the-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/Q5HT-BY6E].
85. See Pandemic Response Education Platform for Immigrant Families, N.Y.
COAL.,
IMMIGR.
https://mcusercontent.com/514cc0c969e98b57f073ce073/files/e9c8404c-6648-4115-b00
4-227a4bcc11f3/Pandemic_Response_Education_Platform_for_Immigrant_Families_
4.13.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/V29S-ERF3] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
86. See Alex Zimmerman et al., How Remote Learning Upended NYC Students
with Disabilities and Their Families, CITY (June 17, 2020, 11:05 PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/education/2020/6/17/21295189/nyc-special-education-students
-remote-learning-struggles [https://perma.cc/S2BN-YJ5N].
87. See id.
88. See Jennifer Gavin, Are Special Education Services Required in the Time of
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Mar.
31,
2020),
COVID-19?,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/20
20/are-special-education-services-required-in-the-time-of-covid19/
[https://perma.cc/8DLC-4WHK] (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.4, 104.33 (Section 504) and 28
C.F.R. § 35.130 (Title II of the American with Disabilities Act)).
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special needs would fall behind academically and socially.”89 The lack
of in-person support forced parents to become de facto educators,
speech therapists, and counselors for their kids — on top of the
economic and emotional fallout of living through the pandemic. 90
Parents have expressed concerns over their children regressing,
particularly with respect to social and communications skills as well as
learning progress.91 The situation raises broader concerns about the
pandemic’s impact on the education rights of students with
disabilities.92
Some parents and families sued New York City and other school
districts around the country for their inadequate COVID-19 responses
to meet special education students’ needs.93 The class action complaint
in J.T. v. De Blasio argues that, during the COVID-19 school closures
and modifications, the New York City School District and others
violated the rights of students with disabilities under federal law,
including the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),94
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 95 Section 504 of the
Federal Rehabilitation Act,96 and state constitutions or statutes.97 Two
hundred families in ten states have signed on as plaintiffs so far, arguing
that remote learning models have been inadequate for students with

89. Eliza Shapiro & Elizabeth A. Harris, This Is Schooling Now for 200,000 N.Y.C.
in
Special
Education,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/nyregion/special-education-coronavirus-nyc.htm
l [https://perma.cc/9VQF-DUUH].
90. See id.
91. See id.; see also Anna North, We Need to Talk About What School Closures
Mean for Kids with Disabilities, VOX (Aug. 6, 2020, 1:40 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/8/6/21353154/schools-reopening-covid-19-special-educatio
n-disabilities [https://perma.cc/9LDS-JNGY].
92. See, e.g., Katelyn Li, For Students with Disabilities, a Pandemic’s Threat to
Hard-Fought Educational Rights, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://harvardpolitics.com/pandemic-educational-rights/
[https://perma.cc/ZER5-M97Q].
93. See Selim Algar, Lawsuit Rips Schools for Abandoning Special Needs Kids
Amid
COVID-19,
N.Y.
POST
(July
16,
2020,
4:57
PM),
https://nypost.com/2020/07/16/lawsuit-rips-schools-for-abandoning-special-needs-kids
-amid-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/LPM3-65J5]; see also Anya Kamenetz, Families of
Children with Special Needs Are Suing in Several States. Here’s Why., NPR (July 23,
2020,
7:06
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/23/893450709/families-of-children-with-special-needs-are
-suing-in-several-states-heres-why [https://perma.cc/7E4D-RV22].
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
97. See Complaint ¶ 126, J.T. v. de Blasio, No. 20 Civ. 5878 (S.D.N.Y. July 27,
2020).
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disabilities. The plaintiffs demand the resumption of full-time, inperson special education, new evaluations for children who are
regressing drastically, compensation for parental expenses incurred
during remote learning, and funding for additional staff.98 This case
and others highlight the difficulties public school leaders face in
determining how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, meeting
public health and safety imperatives while also serving the educational,
social, and emotional needs of so many students, especially those who
need more restrictive placement or additional services. 99 Indeed
representatives of school districts have requested temporary relief
from lawsuits so they may focus funds and attention on how to deliver
services during the pandemic.100 At the same time, disability advocates
express fear that the pandemic will result in limiting disability rights.101
On July 8, 2020, the DOE announced preliminary plans for
staggered in-person schedules for most students; it included an option
of providing in-person services for students with disabilities who have
Individualized Education Programs to the greatest extent possible.102

98. See id. ¶ Prayer for Relief.
99. See, e.g., L.V. ex rel. J.V.2 v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 19 Civ. 5451, 2020 WL
4043529, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19
Civ. 5451, 2020 WL 4040958 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020) (“At the time of the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic in New York City in mid-March of this year, J.V.2 was not
receiving consistent services. L.V., having learned DOE was providing tablet devices
enabled with their own WiFi hot-spots to families, applied for such a device in late
March. L.V. received the device in late April, but was unable to effectively use the
device with J.V.2 for his remote learning sessions, as J.V.2 would not sit still and the
device’s internet connection was not reliable.”); see also Abrams v. Carranza, No.
20-CV-5085 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2020); L.V. ex rel. J.V.2 v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No.
19 Civ. 5451, 2020 WL 4040958, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020) (“The Court holds that
the September 2019 PO contemplated delivery of in-person services, and that
[Defendant] has not adequately explained how its computer-based services are a
satisfactory substitute for J.V.2 during the COVID-19 pandemic, nor conducted an
evaluation of how remote services can be delivered to J.V.2 to meet his individual
needs.”).
100. See, e.g., In the News, 26 SPECIAL EDUC. L. BULL. (2020) (noting requests for
“reasonable, temporary, litigation protection for the vast majority of districts that are
doing everything feasible to meet IDEA during the pandemic, but simply cannot meet
every requirement exactly as intended for every single child”).
101. See Jasmine E. Harris, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 29, 33 (2020) (noting that “COVID-19 is a perfect storm of systemic flaws with
people with disabilities at its eye” and that difficulties presented during the pandemic
may catalyze limits on disability rights).
102. See Archive: Coronavirus Updates, INCLUDENYC (July 8, 2020),
https://www.includenyc.org/content/archive-coronavirus-updates
[https://perma.cc/8R9Q-EUZS]. Alternative staggered schedules also might be
available for students in District 75 due to that special education district’s smaller class
sizes. See id.
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Each approach presents difficulties and risks for students, families,
teachers, and school leaders.

vi. Intersecting Challenges and the Quest for Reopening Guidelines
The challenges, choices, difficulties, and associated inequities noted
above intersect. 103 Key touchstones are health and justice. The
COVID-19 pandemic revealed the urgency of public health and its
intersectional relationship to a full range of social markers among
individuals and in households, communities, and societal hierarchies.
Health is inextricably linked to virtually all aspects of a good society.
Good or bad, health is both a product and a marker of the nature and
fairness of political, social, and economic structures. A person’s
education, level of income, housing, and social status all affect her
health, and all are substantially determined by social, political, and
economic forces. These forces could reinforce the effects of the
tickets we draw in the morally arbitrary “natural and social lotteries.”
Or, they could counter the effects of these lotteries so that we all may
have equal opportunities to flourish — and to be healthy. Who is
healthy and who is not, then, is a fundamental issue of justice.104

Thus, each challenge to public education access during COVID-19, on
its own, tells only part of the story. The challenges for New York City
public school reopening continue along with the pandemic. For
example, families with school-aged children may include young and
elderly members, immigrants, English learners, and students with
disabilities. They may experience job loss, housing insecurity or
homelessness, lack of internet access, and illness or death due to
COVID-19. Taken together, the multiple challenges identified
demonstrate the intersecting social dynamics and inequities impacting
children and families. An understanding of intersectionality should
inform reasoned and equitable decisions about distance learning,
reopening public schools, and broader educational equity.105 The need
to address such inequities holistically is particularly urgent as the

103. See, e.g., Stephanie Pappas, Fighting Inequity in the Face of COVID-19, AM.
PSYCH.
ASS’N
(June
1,
2020),
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2020/06/covid-fighting-inequity
[https://perma.cc/9TT9-P7D6].
104. Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Imagining Global Health with

Justice: Transformative Ideas for Health and Well-Being While Leaving No One
Behind, 108 GEO. L.J. 1535, 1557 (2020).
105. See generally Vivian L. Gadsden, Gender, Race, Class, and the Politics of
Schooling in the Inner City, 673 ANNALS ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (2017)
(noting the salience of intersectional issues of race, gender, class, and social context in
urban public schooling).
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United States experiences a societal reckoning about deep and
longstanding harms associated with inequality and systemic racism.106
New York City and State publicly committed to reopening schools
both safely and equitably during the pandemic. This is a tall order.
Many states, localities, and policymakers looked to New York City as
it planned to reopen the nation’s largest school district. 107
Policymakers needed to address the conundrum presented by the
multiple goals of reopening schools in a way that prioritizes health and
safety and supports the economy while responding to the urgent
impacts associated with socioeconomic inequality and its effects on
public schools.108 An examination of early decisions regarding school
reopening amid the pandemic is instructive.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, EDUCATION, EQUITY,
ECONOMICS, AND GOVERNANCE — WHO DECIDES REOPENING?

The stark inequities in public schooling and the lack of technological
and pandemic emergency preparedness present significant challenges
for school leaders and elected officials. This health crisis is testing
education policy, politics, and governance in urgent, new ways. This
Part overviews those challenges and considers governance- and policyrelated recommendations.

106. See Catherine Powell, “Viral Convergence”: Interconnected Pandemics as
Portal to Racial Justice, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Aug. 5, 2020),

https://www.cfr.org/blog/viral-justice-interconnected-pandemics-portal-racial-justice
[https://perma.cc/UT2N-G9L2] (noting that “[w]e live in a moment of interconnected
pandemics — this era of COVID-19 pandemic has provided a window into the
pandemics of policing, poverty, and racism around the globe” and the need to address
them holistically); Betty A. Rosa, So Much More Than A Teachable Moment, N.Y. ST.
BAR ASS’N (July 15, 2020), https://nysba.org/so-much-more-than-a-teachable-moment/
[https://perma.cc/4UGB-9L5P] (“Simply put, COVID-19 disproportionately harms
people of color and the poor — in terms of health, in terms of employment, and in
terms of the ability to receive a meaningful education.”); see also Together for Justice:
June 3, 2020 Letter from the Chancellor on Striving for Justice, N.Y.C. DEP’T.
EDUCATION
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/vision-and-mission/together-for-justice
[https://perma.cc/VKS3-W6DQ].
107. See, e.g., Eliza Shapiro & Mihir Zaveri, New York Becomes First Big City in
U.S. to Reopen All Its Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/nyregion/nyc-coronavirus-schools-reopen.html
[https://perma.cc/6QRJ-68TA].
108. See Eliza Shapiro, Can N.Y.C. Reopen Schools? The Whole Country Is
Watching,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
1,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/nyregion/nyc-schools-reopening.html
[https://perma.cc/VG4D-QWZ3].
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A. Public Officials’ Response to COVID-19 and Public Schools:
Rhetoric, Responsibility, and Governance

Following the closure of New York City public schools on March 16,
2020,109 the pressure to reopen schools began to mount as early as midApril 2020. Public officials, from the U.S. President to New York
State’s Governor and New York City’s Mayor, soon had much to say
about school closures and reopening plans. President Donald Trump
pressured schools to reopen, emphasizing concerns about the economy
and his political fate if schools remained closed.110 He even threatened
“to condition future federal COVID-19 federal relief funds on whether
or not states reopen school buildings,” 111 a confusing message that
undermined the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
school reopening guidelines, despite questionable authority to do so.112
This left states and localities scrambling to determine how best to
reopen schools amid an ongoing pandemic affecting states and
localities to different degrees in a highly politicized and contentious
environment.113

109. See Eliza Shapiro, New York City Public Schools to Close to Slow Spread of
Coronavirus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/nyregion/nyc-schools-closed.html
[https://perma.cc/QTG5-BS3X].
110. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Trump Pushes Schools to Open in the Fall,
Downplaying Risks as Virus Spreads, WASH. POST (July 7, 2020, 8:35 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/white-house-schools-fall-coronavirus/202
0/07/07/e2b1a16e-c059-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/D8A3-5UBN].
111. Evie Blad, White House to States: Reopen School Buildings or Risk Additional
EDUC.
WK.
(July
8,
2020,
3:44
PM),
Relief
Funds,
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2020/07/trump-rielief-funding-school
-reopening-covid.html [https://perma.cc/68YL-RX3R].
112. See, e.g., Jill Colvin & Mike Stobbe, Trump Undercuts Health Experts — Again
— in Schools Debate, WASH. POST (July 9, 2020, 10:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/schools-or-bars-opening-classrooms-may-me
an-hard-choices/2020/07/09/8277ff7c-c253-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2VM4-CLYZ]; Laura Meckler, Trump Pushes and Threatens in Bid
to Fully Reopen Schools, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020, 8:01 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/trump-schools-cdc-pence/2020/07/08/8a52
d400-c14b-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/SXR9-VTFP].
113. See generally Molly Ball, How President Trump Politicized School Reopenings,
TIME
(July
9,
2020,
6:22
AM),
https://time.com/5864680/donald-trump-school-reopenings-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/GYE5-W84A].
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As the COVID-19 pandemic continued to ravage New York City,114
New York State’s “Pause” Executive Order, 115 including stay-home
directives and the closure of businesses and schools in New York City,
began to stem the tide. By mid-April 2020, the number of COVID-19
cases, hospitalizations, and deaths had begun to decrease.116 However,
the pandemic was far from over. 117 The added hardship, economic
damage, and worsening inequities that followed public school closures
revealed often unacknowledged benefits of in-person, school-based
learning, particularly for many low- and moderate-income and
marginalized students and their families. 118 School closures also
highlighted the value of public schools to the broader community,
including their crucial contribution to its economic and social health.119
Working parents of school-aged children found it extraordinarily
difficult to manage the care and supervision of their children while
continuing to work. 120 The economy in New York and across the
nation was in free fall because of pandemic-related business

114. See, e.g., Ann Choi, Josefa Velasquez & Will Welch, Coronavirus in New York
CITY
(Oct.
25,
2020,
5:29
PM),
https://projects.thecity.nyc/2020_03_covid-19-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/7WWB-VYTW].
115. See Governor Cuomo Signs Executive Order Closing Schools Statewide for
Two Weeks, N.Y. ST.: GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-executive-order-closing-sch
ools-statewide-two-weeks [https://perma.cc/8ULL-HF3C].
116. See Jason Slotkin, New York’s Daily COVID-19 Deaths Below 400 for First
NPR
(Apr.
26,
2020,
5:23
PM),
Time
in
April,
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/26/845199791/new-yor
ks-daily-covid-19-deaths-below-400-for-first-time-in-april
[https://perma.cc/X2UL-TN3D].
117. See Choi et al., supra note 114.
118. See, e.g., COVID-19 Affects New York City Schools, Nation’s Largest District,
NPR
(Mar.
27,
2020,
7:22
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/27/822411665/covid-19-affects-new-york-city-schools-nat
ions-largest-district [https://perma.cc/RRD7-2UEH].
119. See generally Shapiro, supra note 108 (noting the pressure to reopen from some
quarters, that New York could take the lead in school reopening, and that its plan could
serve as a template for other school districts).
120. See Amelia Nierenberg & Adam Pasick, Schools Briefing: Parents in New York
City
Are
Stressed,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/us/germany-nyc-school-reopening.html
[https://perma.cc/AQ4L-JR9L]; see also Molly Schwartz, 5 Kids, 5 Virtual Schools:
One New York City Mom’s “Totally Impossible” Coronavirus Life, MOTHER JONES
(Apr.
17,
2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/coronavirus-updates/2020/04/5-kids-5-virtual-schools-o
ne-new-york-city-moms-totally-impossible-coronavirus-life/
[https://perma.cc/4JPC-82Z2] (describing how a single mother spends 20 hours a week
managing her children’s virtual education while also working full time remotely).
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shutdowns. 121 A wide range of interests and constituencies quickly
emerged to weigh in on public school reopening.122 The importance of
public schools to the economy and society and the complexity of
education governance in New York City and State and the United
States, particularly as it intersects with a public health emergency,
came into high relief.
Yet, in the minds of most parents and teachers, the physical health
and safety of children and school personnel were paramount, and
schools should not reopen until the pandemic was under control. The
virus’s impact on school communities was cause for concern.123 For
example, as of June 22, 2020, the DOE had reported 79 employee
deaths from COVID-19. 124 Concerns about the underreporting of
COVID-19 related cases and deaths in New York City schools arose
when an internal DOE memorandum discouraging case reports to the
Department of Health came to light. 125 These concerns were
magnified by repeated instances of misinformation and inconsistent
messaging about the pandemic from the President of the United
States. 126 Indeed, a key factor that made the national response to
COVID-19 dispiritingly ineffective was the lack of trustworthy
leadership from President Trump. His failure to heed — and his
statements actively discrediting — the warnings and guidance provided

121. See Patricia Cohen & Jim Tankersley, America’s Economy Begins to Shut
Down as Pandemic Measures Take Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/business/economy/coronavirus-us-economy-shut
down.html [https://perma.cc/88TR-E7M7].
122. See, e.g., Editorial Board, School-Opening Extortion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3,
2020, 7:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/school-opening-extortion-11596496376
[https://perma.cc/V92X-UM5Q]; Amy Davidson Sorkin, The Woeful Inadequacy of
School-Reopening
Plans,
NEW
YORKER
(Aug.
9,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/17/the-woeful-inadequacy-of-school-r
eopening-plans [https://perma.cc/C8AY-R6T7].
123. See, e.g., Sarah Jaffe, How the New York City School System Failed the Test
of
COVID-19,
NATION
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/schools-teachers-covid/
[https://perma.cc/FZ2N-SSUA].
124. See
COVID-19
Reporting,
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
EDUCATION,
https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/news/covid-19-losses
[https://perma.cc/F5XB-UUZ3] (last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
125. See Greg B. Smith, Memo Ordering NYC Schools to Keep Virus Cases Quiet
Probed,
CITY
(Apr.
14,
2020,
8:02
PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/4/14/21247112/memo-ordering-nyc-schools-to-keep-viru
s-cases-quiet-probed [https://perma.cc/ULH4-574W].
126. See, e.g., Christian Paz, All the President’s Lies About the Coronavirus,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
1,
2020,
10:25
AM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/08/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/6
08647/ [https://perma.cc/S3YC-H2JP].

338

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

by public health experts led to confusion, misinformation, and an
Indeed, the
ineffective and polarized national response. 127
politicization of U.S. responses to the pandemic has been alarming.128
The abysmal federal response highlighted the importance of state and
local leadership in navigating this public health crisis, including the
critically important questions of when and how to reopen public
schools safely and deliver public education effectively and equitably
during and after the pandemic.
B. The Constitutional Structure of Education and Public Health
Governance in the United States

Education in the United States has long been understood as
structured to be primarily a matter of state and local control.129 Under
the U.S. Constitution, education is considered to be among the powers
reserved to the states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. 130
Nonetheless, over the years, the U.S. Department of Education (ED)
has expanded its influence over U.S. education primarily through its
spending power. For example, for many years, Congress has exerted
significant influence on public education through the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which long has focused federal
spending on efforts to achieve educational equity by directing federal
funds to states with an aim to ensure equal access to resources and to
improve low-income students’ academic achievement.131

127. See id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American
Democracy — and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 100 (2020) (“The Administration’s

response to the pandemic will go down in American history as one of the nation’s
greatest intelligence and administrative failures.”).
128. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 113; Bill Chappell, ‘Please Don’t Politicize This
Virus,’ WHO Head Says After Trump Threatens Funding, NPR (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:42
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/08/829944795/please-d
on-t-politicize-this-virus-who-head-says-after-trump-threatens-funding
[https://perma.cc/RZ7A-EY36].
129. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 959, 969 (2015) (“The constitutional foundations for [education federalism]
lie in the omission of education from the purview of federal authority and the Tenth
Amendment’s reservation of state authority in all areas that the Constitution does not
assign to Congress.”).
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (noting matters not enumerated in the Constitution
are reserved to the states); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that there is no fundamental right to education in the
Constitution).
131. See Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every
Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2017).
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However, in 2015, ESEA was amended dramatically via the Every
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) 132 to limit federal influence on
education in response to a backlash caused by federal testing and
accountability measures imposed under the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), which ESSA replaced. 133 ESSA’s retreat from federal
education equity efforts has prompted renewed arguments for a federal
constitutional right to an adequate and equitable public education.
A number of theories, recent advocacy, and cases seek recognition
of a federal education right, including arguments related to civics and
democracy, and to due process and equal protection.134 Yet, a federal
constitutional right to education remains elusive. By contrast, “[e]very
state has an express constitutional right to some form of education.”135
Yet, the structure and governance of education differ among the states.
Thus, under federalism, education policy and governance differ among
the several states.
As with education, federalism complicates the respective roles of the
federal government and states and localities in public health
Police powers, including primary
emergency management. 136
responsibility for health emergencies, reside in the first instance with
state and local governments.137 These are accompanied by significant
132. Pub. L. No. 114–95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
133. See Black, supra note 131, at 1309, 1311–12.
134. See, e.g., Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 621 (6th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (Section 1983 action against
the Governor of Michigan and other state officials, where plaintiffs alleged they had
been denied access to literacy on account of their races in violation of their rights under
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 735, 740–41 (2018) (describing federal lawsuits claiming that the educational
inequalities in its state violate the U.S. Constitution as well as theories under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause). Indeed, there is a
growing interest in identifying and establishing positive constitutional rights at this
time of crisis. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Positive Constitutionalism in a Pandemic:
Demanding Responsibility from the Trump Administration, 12 CONLAWNOW 15, 15
(2020) (arguing to “renew the quest for a more positive constitutionalism in which we
routinely make demands on government rather than emphasize its limits”). However,
unless and until a positive federal right to education is established, state control over
education, for better or worse, remains.
135. Carter G. Phillips, A Class Action Lawsuit for the Right to a Minimum
Education in Detroit, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 412, 414 (2020).
136. See, e.g., Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency
Responses Through Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 396 (2012)
(“Existing legal infrastructure places the nexus of emergency response at the local and
state level, with federal officials only intervening once the state requests assistance or
the circumstances reach a sufficient level of severity.”).
137. See id.; see also Responsibilities in a Public Health Emergency, NAT’L COUNCIL
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(Oct.
29,
2014),
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federal power to respond to national emergencies. The U.S.
Constitution assigns Congress legislative and appropriations powers
that may be used to respond to national emergencies, including public
health emergencies. 138 The Constitution also accords the President
broad executive powers to respond to national emergencies. 139 In
addition to emergency powers accorded to the President by Congress
through legislation, the Constitution assigns the President certain
inherent powers stemming from the executive powers over foreign
affairs and national security, among others.140 The scope and limits of
such inherent powers are not well defined.141 Although the limits of
presidential power are obscure, Article II, no less than Article I, is part
of “a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”142
While the contours of inherent executive emergency powers remain
contested, the trend has been toward according the President broad
discretion both by constitutional deference and legislative
delegation. 143 Still, the President’s power remains subject to checks
and balances and to the limits of federalism.
Federalism is significantly implicated in government public health
emergency response. The states, under police powers reserved to them

https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/public-health-chart.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YWT2-ZU4U].
138. See, e.g., Emily Berman, The Roles of the State and Federal Governments in a
Pandemic, 11 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2020) (“[U]nder our federal
constitutional system, the states enjoy inherent police power to regulate in the service
of the public health, safety, and welfare of their people. States thus retain a general
authority to regulate that has no federal analogue.”).
139. See Joshua L. Friedman, Emergency Powers of the Executive: The President’s
Authority When All Hell Breaks Loose, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 265, 267 (2012).
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 1183, 1205, 1209 (2018) (stating “[o]n one side of the debate are those who adhere
to Curtiss-Wright and national security exceptionalism, . . . stem[ming] from the
President’s near absolute constitutional powers over foreign affairs and national
security, extreme deference to the President’s national security acts, and limited to no
judicial review . . . . Critics of national security exceptionalism . . . point to the
inadequate safeguards against the President limited only by political constraints” and
argue in favor of the limitations set forth in Youngstown).
142. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 661 (1952) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819)).
143. See, e.g., National Emergencies and the President’s Inherent Powers, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 303, 305 (1950) (“Although enforcing statutory law is one of the President’s
major functions, he frequently acts in the absence of statutory authority. He has certain
functions wholly derived from constitutional grants of power, and sometimes these
have been referred to as ‘inherent powers.’ The most important of these are the war
power and the power over foreign affairs.”).
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by the Tenth Amendment, have primary authority to manage health
crises under their purview, including powers to issue intrastate
quarantine orders.144 At the same time, the federal government has
the limited and exclusive authority, for example, to quarantine
individuals traveling between the states or coming into the country
under legislative delegations enacted under the commerce power and
the Constitution’s grant of inherent national security powers.145 Thus,
the executive has broad national emergency powers under the
Constitution and statutes but limited direct authority over state matters
of public health and public school closures or reopening. To the extent
the federal government has authority under its commerce, national
security, spending, or other constitutional powers, it can play a
significant essential role in helping to manage the pandemic response
(or not).
C. The Federal COVID-19 Response: Federalism, Public Health, and
Public Education

Both Congress and the President have important tools, powers, and
roles in responding to and managing the pandemic. For example, in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic’s dire impact on all aspects of the
economy, Congress overcame significant legislative gridlock to pass the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).146
“The CARES Act was enacted on March 27, 2020, to provide trillions
of dollars in financial relief, and other assistance, to Americans
suffering from the coronavirus pandemic and its economic fallout.”147
It included provisions earmarking approximately $16 billion to help
elementary and secondary schools maintain their operations and
provide effective education during the pandemic. Some of this money
was distributed to governors to allocate at their discretion to local
education agencies most severely impacted by the coronavirus and
some was to be distributed “in the same proportion as each State
received under part A of title I of the [Elementary and Secondary
Education Act]” which directs funds to low-income students to
enhance equity.148

144. See Maryam Jamshidi, The Federal Government Probably Can’t Order
Statewide Quarantines, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1, *1 (2020).
145. See id.
146. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116–136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
147. Michigan v. DeVos, No. 3:20-CV-04478-JD, 2020 WL 5074397, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2020).
148. Id. (alteration in original).
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At the direction of the Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, the ED
issued guidance providing “that private schools should get a share [of
CARES Act education funds] based on their overall student
population, and not just their number of low-income students.” 149
Several states successfully challenged the guidance as inconsistent with
the Act, winning an injunction against the ED’s interpretation favoring
the allocation of CARES Act funds to private schools without regard
to their share of low-income students.150 Secretary DeVos’s approach
to administering CARES Act funding demonstrated not only a lack of
concern for directing relief funds to reach the most vulnerable students,
but also a greater interest in private schooling than in equity. DeVos
further revealed a policy agenda favoring privatization over equity
when she said that the pandemic provides “good” opportunity to
“rethink” education in a manner favoring school choice and
privatization.151 In addition, “[i]n May [2020], while school districts
were struggling with the conversion to remote education, [DeVos]
announced she was using $180 million of federal relief aid to create a
competition for states to apply for ‘rethinking’ education.”152 Thus,
DeVos has attempted to administer CARES Act funds in a manner
that prioritized an education privatization policy agenda over the
equitable and effective distribution of emergency funds to schools.
Similar concerns about negligent policy driven by politics have
arisen regarding President Trump’s broader coronavirus pandemic
emergency response. On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a
national emergency concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. 153 The
emergency was declared pursuant to the Stafford Act, Public Health
Service Act, and National Emergencies Act. 154 Trump’s emergency

149. Id. at *2.
150. See id. at *3, *9.
151. See Valerie Strauss, DeVos: It’s a ‘Good Thing’ That Pandemic Will Force
Schools to Make Long-Overdue Changes, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2020, 6:24 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/08/28/devos-its-good-thing-that-pan
demic-will-force-schools-make-long-overdue-changes/ [https://perma.cc/92K5-YEJ7].
152. Id.
153. See Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020)
Proclamation
on
Declaring
a
National
Emergency],
[hereinafter
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-em
ergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/
[https://perma.cc/F242-V5CV].
154. See generally President Trump Declares State of Emergency for COVID-19,
NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/president-trump-declares-s
tate-of-emergency-for-covid-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/QHB3-7NPP].
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declaration under Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act permitted the
federal government to declare an emergency without a governor’s
request, yet made available only certain subsets of Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) recovery funds.155 The Stafford Act,
like most federal emergency management, “epitomizes [a] local-first
approach. Primarily a funding mechanism, the Stafford Act authorizes
the President to declare an ‘emergency’ or ‘major disaster’ at the
request of state officials or, in rare cases, without such a request.”156
The National Emergencies Act (NEA) generally gives the President
broad discretion to activate a range of statutory powers provided in
other statutes. 157 Certain provisions of the Act give the President
authority to declare a “national emergency” without a specific state
request.158 “Once one of these declarations has been made, the federal
government may provide resources including financial, material, and
logistical support through [FEMA].”159
The Public Health Service Act authorizes specific federal health
emergency powers and provides for the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to declare a public health
emergency. 160 The HHS Secretary may then make grants, enter
contracts, investigate causes of disease and methods of disease
prevention, and modify regulatory requirements to encourage effective
medical responses. 161 HHS Secretary Alex Azar declared a public
health emergency on January 31, 2020, in response to the COVID-19
outbreak, and the Administration established the Coronavirus Task
Force led by Vice President Mike Pence. 162 HHS has since issued
several policy modifications and waivers to support the health care
155. See id.
156. Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses
Through Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 396 (2012).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See Legal Authority, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PDM4-66AB].
161. See Christina Y. Chan, Support for the First Line of Defense in Public Health
Emergencies, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1354 (2011).
162. See Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency, supra note 153; see also
Carol Pearson, 5 Former CDC Directors Criticize US Handling of Pandemic, VOA
(Aug.
28,
2020,
12:50
AM),
https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/5-former-cdc-directors-criticize-us-han
dling-pandemic [https://perma.cc/5AQ2-UVCT] (having the Vice President, rather
than the head of the CDC, lead the Task Force has been a cause for concern among
several health experts that the federal pandemic response would be guided primarily
by politics rather than scientific data and public health concerns).
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community’s response efforts. 163 Despite various available federal
emergency powers, the Trump Administration’s pandemic response
was disorganized, inconsistent, and often incoherent.164
The President’s lax leadership, mixed messages, and politicization of
the virus response have hampered the Task Force’s ability to curb the
spread of COVID-19. Public health experts raised concerns, for
example, that political pressure had caused the CDC to change its
guidelines in dangerous ways, unsupported by current scientific and
public health understandings of the virus. 165 Thus, while CDC
guidelines are a public health touchstone for determining school
reopening,166 states largely have been left to fill a federal leadership
vacuum in determining school reopening amid the pandemic. Because
of this, most U.S. pandemic response efforts, including school closure
and reopening plans, have been left to states and localities with
insufficient and inconsistent federal guidance or support.
The President and Education Secretary have not supported safe,
effective school reopening amid the pandemic, nor have they shown
any concern for improving educational equity. Their approach to
education has been anti-democratic and non-inclusive with a focus on
privatization and deregulation.

163. See President Trump Declares State of Emergency for COVID-19, supra note
154.
164. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, The Trump
Administration’s Pandemic Response Is Structured to Fail, REGUL. REV. (May 19,
2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/05/19/camacho-glicksman-trump-administration-p
andemic-response-structured-fail/ [https://perma.cc/J5CX-V7UQ].
165. See, e.g., Miriam Berger et al., Democrats Denounce CDC Rules Change as
‘Political Propaganda,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2020, 11:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/26/coronavirus-covid-live-updates-us
/ [https://perma.cc/UWV8-HSYB]; Mark Mazzetti, Noah Weiland & Sharon
LaFraniere, Behind the White House Effort to Pressure the C.D.C. on School
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2020),
Openings,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/us/politics/white-house-cdc-coronavirus-schools.
html [https://perma.cc/KG4N-WSLW].
166. See generally Coronavirus (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/index.html
[https://perma.cc/RM7B-VPQ9] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (providing resources and
health guidelines for the public, including information related to schools and child
safety).
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D. The New York State Board of Regents’s Education
Governance Role

The New York State Board of Regents (the Regents or the Board)
governs New York State education policy.167 In 1784, the Regents was
created by statute 168 and was later continued under the New York
State Constitution. 169 Pursuant to New York State Constitution
Article XI, Section 2, the Board of Regents is given broad regulatory
power by the New York State legislature, which has the authority to
increase, modify, or diminish the Board’s power.170 Under New York
Education Law Section 201, the Board of Regents’s primary purpose
is to “encourage and promote education.” 171 It is responsible for
general supervision of all educational services in New York State as
well as for setting overall public educational policy in New York.172
Because the New York Constitution roots much of the Regents’s
power in the state legislature, the Regents is given broad statutory
authority over education matters. New York Education Law Section
101, for example, grants the Regents the authority to appoint or
remove the DOE’s Commissioner of Education. 173 It states the
purpose of the University of the State of New York, which includes
encourag[ing] and promot[ing] education, . . . visit[ing] and
inspect[ing] its several institutions and departments, . . . distribut[ing]
to or expand[ing] or administer[ing] for them such property and funds
as the state may appropriate therefor or as the university may own or

167. See SCHOOL LAW 1 (Pilar Sokol et al. eds., 37th ed. 2019). The Board oversees
the University of the State of New York, which consists of all public and private
elementary and secondary schools in the State; all privately and publicly controlled
institutions of higher education, including the schools in the State University of New
York (SUNY) and City University of New York (CUNY) systems; and all libraries,
museums, and other educational and cultural institutions admitted to or incorporated
by the University.
168. See James D. Folts, History of the University of the State of New York and the
State Education Department 1784–1996, N.Y. ST. LIBR. (Nov. 1996),
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/edocs/education/sedhist.htm#appxa
[https://perma.cc/XCC7-SWBU].
169. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
170. See CHRISTINE M. G. DAVIS ET AL., 95 N.Y. JUR. 2D SCHOOLS, UNIVERSITIES,
AND COLLEGES § 717; see also 10.1 Governance of New York State Education, SUNY
ONEONTA,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-oneonta-education106/chapter/governance-o
f-new-york-state-education/ [https://perma.cc/YUU5-DJTG] (last visited Oct. 24,
2020) (describing the governing hierarchy of the New York State education system).
171. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2009).
172. See id.
173. See id. § 101.
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hold in trust or otherwise, and . . . perform[ing] such other duties as
may be intrusted to it.174

Education Law Section 207 provides that
the regents shall exercise legislative functions concerning the
educational system of the state, determine its educational policies,
and, except, as to the judicial functions of the commissioner of
education, establish rules for carrying into effect the laws and policies
of the state, relating to education, and the functions, powers, duties
and trusts conferred or charged upon the university and the education
department.175

This provision gives the Regents broad authority to craft the State’s
reopening strategy.
The Board of Regents presides over the New York State Education
Department (NYSED), which is responsible for the supervision of all
public schools within the State and is responsible for setting education
policy 176 — testing, graduation requirements, standards, and
curriculum. The Regents and NYSED have the power to enact
regulations carrying the force of law for public schools. Thus, the
Regents and NYSED, which the Regents oversees, have primary legal
authority to determine public education policy, including school
reopening policy.
E. The New York State Governor’s Role in Education and
Public Health

While most state education departments are executive agencies
under the control of the Governor, New York State’s education
structure is more complex. As noted above, in New York, the
Governor is not tasked with education policy and does not oversee
NYSED. Instead, the New York State Board of Regents is responsible
for the general supervision of all educational activities in the State.
However, the Governor shares responsibility with the legislature to

174. Id. § 201.
175. Id. § 207.
176. See Harris v. Dutchess Cnty. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 25 N.Y.S.3d 527, 533
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Harris v. Dutchess Cnty. Bd. of
Coop. Educ. Servs., 93 N.Y.S.3d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (“[T]he Board of Regents
and the Commissioner of Education are vested with the task of managing and
controlling the educational affairs of the State’s schools . . . .”).
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enact laws, including education law, and approves the state budget,
which provides funding to all public schools.177
New York State schools are organized across 700 school districts. In
these districts, geographic boundaries and attendance zones align with
residential patterns, creating segregated schools. Public schools are
primarily funded by state and local resources; on average, the federal
government pays for less than 10% of K–12 education.178 Having a
large number of small school districts in New York State tends to
increase inequality. Specifically, smaller districts allow for certain
districts to be more homogenous and wealthy and provide fewer
opportunities to pool resources to ensure less-resourced communities
of color benefit from proximity to wealthy white communities.179
The governor and legislature’s budgetary power over education
operates within a localist structure that reinforces segregation and
unequal funding. Indeed, some have argued broadly for the
abandonment of such local education structures in favor, for example,
of regional organization of education districts by “shifting much of the
power currently enjoyed by local governments into a regional
government.”180 Local control of education, including its influence on
education budgets, has been remarkably persistent, limiting the ability
of school funding reforms to close inequity gaps.181
The Governor has a limited role in crafting education policy under
New York State education governance law. However, although the
Governor is not given power under law to craft education policy
directly, he has several powerful tools at his disposal to impact
education. The state budget is perhaps the most potent vehicle through

177. See “Who Is Responsible for Education in NYS?,” LONG ISLAND OPT OUT,
https://lioptout.org/nys-education-policy/ [https://perma.cc/Y7VG-FTT6] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2020).
178. See 10 Facts About K-12 Education Funding, U.S. DEP’T EDUCATION (Sept. 19,
2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/MQP7-PNSU].
179. See Elissa Nadworny & Cory Turner, This Supreme Court Case Made School
District Lines a Tool for Segregation, NPR (July 25, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/25/739493839/this-supreme-court-case-made-school-distr
ict-lines-a-tool-for-segregation [https://perma.cc/5K75-F7G8] (discussing the impact
on continued school segregation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which held that federal courts do not have authority to
impose a multi-district desegregation plan on schools outside Detroit).
180. Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in
Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1454 (2014).
181. See Kevin E. Jason, Dismantling the Pillars of White Supremacy: Obstacles in
Eliminating Disparities and Achieving Racial Justice, 23 CUNY L. REV. 139, 178–79
(2020).
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which the Governor can influence education in the state.182 Thus, even
though Governor Cuomo does not have formal legal power over
education governance and policy, he has other significant powers that
affect education. These include approving legislation, his authority
over the budget process, and, more recently, using his public health
emergency powers as levers to push education policy reforms.
Of most immediate relevance to COVID-19 school reopening,
Governor Cuomo, like other state governors, has significant public
health emergency powers.183 States have significant power to regulate
individuals, groups, and property to protect and secure the public’s
health. These powers include isolation (segregating individuals known
to have an infectious disease), quarantine (segregating individuals with
suspected or known exposure to an infectious disease), surveillance,
property condemnation, and compulsory vaccinations.184 The powers
afforded to state governors to respond to a public health emergency
often are sweeping. For example, New York Executive Law Section
29-A provides that
[s]ubject to the state constitution, the federal constitution and federal
statutes and regulations, the governor may by executive order
temporarily suspend any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules
or regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster
emergency, if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder,
or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster or if necessary to
assist or aid in coping with such disaster.185

The law further provides that “[t]he governor, by executive order, may
issue any directive during a state disaster emergency declared” in
several instances, including an epidemic or disease outbreak.186 The
182. See Jessica Bakeman, Cuomo Moves to Take Control of Education Policy,
POLITICO
(Dec.
19,
2014,
5:45
AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2014/12/cuomo-moves-to-take
-control-of-education-policy-018335 [https://perma.cc/X343-NSFM] (“Cuomo’s role in
crafting the state’s spending plan provides his primary power over the education
system, and it also offers him maximum leverage in negotiating with lawmakers,
because he typically has lots of bargaining chips.” In 2014, the Director of State
Operations, Jim Malatras, stated that the Governor’s power over education is limited
to the budget process, and that he intends to introduce reforms during that process).
183. N.Y. Executive Law Section 29-a(1) was amended in March 2020 by the New
York State Senate to provide even broader powers related to the COVID-19
pandemic.
See
Senate
Bill
S7919,
N.Y.
ST.
SENATE,
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s7919 [https://perma.cc/UW8P-KM74]
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
184. See Fazal R. Khan, Ensuring Government Accountability During Public
Health Emergencies, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 322 (2010).
185. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2020).
186. Id.
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limiting principle to the grant of this broad authority is that “[a]ny such
directive must be necessary to cope with the disaster and may provide
for procedures reasonably necessary to enforce such directive.”187
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Cuomo exercised
sweeping emergency powers impacting all aspects of government and
business. This included the closing188 (and reopening)189 of schools and
related requirements. For example, on March 7, 2020, the Governor
issued Executive Order 202, declaring a state of emergency over the
COVID-19 outbreak. 190 That order was followed by numerous
executive orders, including those closing schools and suspending laws
and regulations that conflict with school closures, 191 suspending
businesses,192 extending court deadlines, providing for quarantine and
travel restrictions, and suspending elections.193 Because public school
reopening plans depend heavily on the status of public health
emergency declarations and requirements, the Governor has
tremendous power in this regard.
The question is how far the Governor may extend these emergency
powers in his quest to “reimagine” public education.194 This is where
the Governor’s authority is tenuous at best. On May 5, 2020, Governor
Cuomo announced a plan to reimagine education. The Governor’s
announcement noted that “[t]he state will bring together a group of

187. Id.
188. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.4 (Mar. 16, 2020) (providing that “every school
in the state of New York is hereby directed to close no later than Wednesday, March
18, 2020, for a period of two weeks, ending April 1, 2020”); see also N.Y. Exec. Order
No. 202.37 (June 5, 2020) (providing that “special education services and instruction
required under Federal, state or local laws, rules, or regulations, may be provided in
person for the summer term in school districts. Any district providing such services in
person must follow State and Federal guidance”).
189. See Governor Cuomo Announces That, Based on Each Region’s Infection
Rate, Schools Across New York State Are Permitted to Open This Fall, N.Y. ST.:
GOVERNOR
ANDREW
M.
CUOMO
(Aug.
7,
2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-based-each-regions-i
nfection-rate-schools-across-new-york-state-are [https://perma.cc/E39W-2686].
190. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202 (Mar. 7, 2020).
191. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.1 (Mar. 12, 2020) (providing, among other
things, the suspension of the law to allow a waiver of requirements necessary for the
apportionment of school aid so that schools are not penalized for not meeting
instructional requirements during pandemic closures).
192. For example, Executive Order Number 202.6 required that to the maximum
extent possible, all businesses and not-for profit entities throughout the State utilize
work from home and telecommuting procedures. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.6
(Mar. 18, 2020).
193. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.2 (Mar. 14, 2020) (suspending laws related to
elections).
194. See Video, Audio, Photos & Rush Transcript, supra note 1.
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leaders to answer these questions in collaboration with the Gates
Foundation, who will support New York State by helping bring
together national and international experts, as well as provide expert
advice as needed.”195 He went on to speak specifically about his plans
to replace the “old” education system:
One of the areas we can really learn from is education . . . [because]
[t]he old model of [our education system where] everybody goes and
sits in the classroom and the teacher is in front of that classroom [is
not going to work in the new normal] . . . . When we reopen schools,
let’s open a better school and let’s open a smarter education system.
I want to thank the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. We’ll be
working with them on this project. Bill Gates i[s] a visionary in many
ways . . . . I think we now have a moment in history where we can
actually incorporate and advance [his] ideas [on technology and
education].196

This is a matter squarely within the purview of the Regents and
NYSED. The Governor’s plans to reimagine education for the future
are education policy matters, as they consider
[h]ow [they] can use technology to provide more opportunities to
students no matter where they are; [h]ow [they] can provide shared
education among schools and colleges using technology; [h]ow can
technology reduce educational inequality, including English as a new
language students; [h]ow can [they] use technology to meet
educational needs of students with disabilities; [h]ow can [they]
provide educators more tools to use technology; [h]ow can technology
break down barriers to K–12 and Colleges and Universities to provide
greater access to high quality education no matter where the student
lives; and [g]iven ongoing socially distancing rules, how can [they]
deploy classroom technology, like immersive cloud virtual classrooms
learning, to recreate larger class or lecture hall environments in
different locations?197

Governor Cuomo’s direct involvement in education policy matters
raises serious questions about New York education governance,
including who makes policy, who provides input and expertise, and
how decisions are made. It also raises questions about the influence of
wealthy private actors in New York education policymaking, a matter
of particular concern given the Gates Foundation’s fairly recent history

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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with education policy blunders in New York City. 198 Indeed, New
York City is a primary focus of education equity concerns highlighted
by the COVID-19 pandemic.
F. New York City and the Mayor’s Role in Public Education and
Public Health

New York City is one of the several school districts under the New
York State Regents’s purview. Under New York State law,199 the New
York City School District — once governed by local school boards and
a citywide Board of Education — is now under mayoral control. 200
Under mayoral control, the Mayor appoints the DOE’s Chancellor and
nine of 15 members of the City’s Board of Education.201 The Mayor
thus has direct oversight and policymaking control over the City’s
schools, consistent with state law. 202 New York City’s school
governance structure also includes Community District Education
Councils to permit input at the local school district level.203 However,
the overall structure gives the Mayor and Chancellor authority over,
and makes them accountable for, school policymaking and
implementation in New York City.

198. See, e.g., Natalie Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and
Philathrocapitalism: Can Public Law Norms Manage Private Wealth’s Influence on
Public Education Policymaking?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 161, 184–86 (2016)
[hereinafter Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and Philathrocapitalism].
199. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (McKinney 2019) (providing that the “board of

education shall consist of thirteen appointed members: one member to be appointed
by each borough president of the city of New York; and eight members to be appointed
by the mayor of the city of New York”).
200. See Kate Taylor, Does It Matter Who Runs New York City’s Schools?, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/nyregion/new-york-school-control.html
[https://perma.cc/8AXG-BMVH].
201. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-b (under a 2019 continuation and amendment of
the mayoral control law, “the board of education shall consist of fifteen members: one
member to be appointed by each borough president of the city of New York, one
member to be elected by community district education council presidents, and nine
members to be appointed by the Mayor of the city of New York”).
202. See id.
203. See Jason, supra note 181, at 186 (“Despite having 1.1 million students, New
York City represents a single district among the more than 700 districts in the state.
The entire district is run through a centralized Department of Education (‘DOE’)
rather than a school board. DOE employees, including the Chancellor, report to the
Mayor. The entire district is divided into thirty-two Community School Districts
(‘CSDs’), each with a local advisory body called a Community Education Council.”);
see also Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy: Does
Public Participation Matter?, 53 VILL. L. REV. 297, 318–19 (2008).

352

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

As leaders of one of New York State’s many local school districts,
the City’s Mayor and Chancellor are bound by the Regents and
NYSED regulations204 and are advised to follow policy guidance on
education matters. Nonetheless, New York State’s governance
structure leaves significant public school decision making to local
districts, and in New York City, such decisions fall to the Mayor and
Chancellor. Of course, the New York City School District, comprised
of more than one million students, is the largest in the nation. At the
same time, New York City’s DOE is just one of many departments
under the Mayor’s purview.
The Mayor also is responsible for the City’s public health. New
York State Executive Law Section 24 provides that a governmental
“chief executive may promulgate local emergency orders to protect life
and property or to bring [an] emergency situation under control.”205
The Mayor’s exercise of these powers may not conflict with the
Governor’s exercise of emergency authority under Executive Law
Section 29-A, which permits the Governor to suspend the Mayor’s
orders where it is applicable. In the face of the Governor’s overriding
executive order, the Mayor may argue that the New York State
Constitution limits the State’s ability to control local affairs.206 But
although the New York State Constitution provides certain home rule
protections, the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted those
protections to be limited. 207 Thus, the Mayor’s emergency powers
must be consistent with the Governor’s and may be suspended by the
Governor. Indeed, an amendment to Executive Law Section 29-A
passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic expanded the
Governor’s emergency response powers.208
204. See N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 207 (McKinney 2012); see also
Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountability,
Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 78 (2013) [hereinafter Gomez-Velez, Urban Public
Education Reform] (“Statewide, oversight of the public school system is vested in the
Regents of the University of the State of New York. The regents are appointed by the
state legislature, oversee the State Education Department (SED) and appoint the
Commissioner of Education (Commissioner). The SED and Commissioner supervise
and manage the state’s public schools, promulgating regulations and determining
teaching standards and curricula, among other things.”).
205. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2012).
206. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).
207. See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 21 N.Y.3d 289, 301–02 (2013).
208. N.Y. Executive Law Section 29-a now authorizes the Governor, “by executive
order,” to
temporarily suspend any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or
regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency,
if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action
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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2020, Mayor de
Blasio issued executive orders declaring a local state of emergency209
and closing schools.210 He thereafter issued a series of executive orders
suspending council meetings, hearings, and elections; relaxing
regulatory requirements to permit non-essential personnel to remain
at home; and closing or limiting the number of people in congregate
care settings.211 The Mayor’s and the Governor’s initial COVID-19
responses were critiqued as being too slow to impose needed limits and
“hampered by their own confused guidance, unheeded warnings,
delayed decisions and political infighting.”212 Part of the initial delay
was due to an inept federal response. 213 Still, one of the strongest
critiques of the City’s response was its delay in closing schools, which
would entail a “virtual shutdown of the city.”214 The State’s and City’s
approaches to school closure have implications not only for the
economy and educational efficacy, but also for equity.
III. SCHOOL GOVERNANCE MODELS AND EQUITY IMPLICATIONS
AMID COVID-19

A key question related to prioritizing equity in public schools’
coronavirus response relates to whether and how particular
governance models enhance or diminish attention to educational
equity. As noted above, public school governance in New York State
and New York City involves a complex mix of systems and approaches.
Education scholar Jeffrey Henig categorizes school governance into
“single-purpose” and “general-purpose” structures and centralized
and de-centralized organization.215 New York includes single-purpose
education governance at the state level by the Regents and NYSED,
an independent department focused exclusively on education and not

necessary to cope with the disaster or if necessary to assist or aid in coping
with such disaster.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2020).
209. See N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 98 (Mar. 12, 2020).
210. See N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 99 (Mar. 15, 2020).
211. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 100 (Mar. 16, 2020).
212. J. David Goodman, How Delays and Unheeded Warnings Hindered New
York’s
Virus
Fight,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/nyregion/new-york-coronavirus-response-delays.
html [https://perma.cc/VJA3-2W5X].
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See JEFFREY R. HENIG, THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM 5–7, 14–19 (2013).
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under the general purview of the State’s Governor.216 It also includes
general-purpose education governance in New York City centralized
under mayoral control where the City’s DOE is one of several
departments under the Mayor’s purview. 217 This contrasts with decentralized, local governance in other school districts around the State.
New York’s public school governance also includes privatization
influences in its charter school system and the influence of private
corporate and philanthropic actors on public education policy
influencing a variety of school “reforms” over the last two decades.218
According to Henig, many recent education shifts may be viewed as
part of a broader trend away from single-purpose education
governance to structures under which education competes among the
many priorities considered part of general-purpose governance. 219
Henig casts this as a move away from “exceptionalism” in education.220
In lieu of special purpose, localized education governance structures
dominated by highly focused interest groups (and insulated to some
degree from “normal politics”), Henig observed a trend toward the
“gradual reabsorption of educational decision making into multilevel,
general-purpose government and politics.”221 He attributes much of
this reabsorption to the increasing involvement of executives —
presidents, governors, and mayors — in education policy, while also
noting the roles of legislatures and the judiciary at all levels.222 The
trend away from education exceptionalism and single-purpose
government “means that education is becoming more like other
domestic policy areas” with implications for how it is shaped and
influenced.223
The COVID-19 emergency and its implications for public schools
have demonstrated the importance of strong leadership and
governance. This is a critical moment to examine the effect of
education governance structures on decision making and policy
development, particularly with respect to issues of effectiveness and

216. See id. at 3–4, 16.
217. See id.
218. See generally Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and
Philathrocapitalism, supra note 198, at 170 (describing how some critics are concerned
that reforms encouraged by a small group of philanthropic billionaires will actually
have the effect of privatizing public education, to its detriment).
219. See HENIG, supra note 215, at 3–4.
220. See id. at 4.
221. Id. at 3 (discussing the trend away from single-purpose education governance
and other education governance trends).
222. See id. at 4.
223. Id.
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equity. The pandemic laid bare stark inequities in public education
along with the critical importance of governance. It therefore provides
a unique chance to examine how different forms of education
governance serve to support effective and equitable education at a time
of crisis and opportunity. This crisis marks a flashpoint to examine, for
example, the benefits and drawbacks of single-purpose versus generalpurpose structures on the state level; centralized versus decentralized
organization on the local level; and the influence of privatization and
the treatment of education as a commodity rather than a public good.
It is also a moment to consider the federal government’s role in
supporting public education across the country, including its
relationship to state and local governance and how it might catalyze (or
thwart) equity in states and localities.
A. Single-Purpose Versus General-Purpose
Public Education Governance

While New York City’s education governance combining both
single-purpose governance by the Regents and NYSED and general
purpose by the Mayor may be considered a historical anomaly, there
are good reasons to cloister education governance and policymaking.
These include a certain insulation from the ordinary political hurlyburly and a focus on educational expertise in policymaking and on the
civic and democratic purposes of public education. A primary theory
supporting single-purpose education governance is that it insulates
education policymaking — supporting a unique focus on ensuring
substantive education goals are considered apart from other political
and budgetary imperatives. The model also is thought to enhance the
inclusion of education professionals in decision making, bringing the
benefit of pedagogical expertise and practical experience to
governance. A different theory of education governance models
categorizes New York State’s school governance model as
“Platonist.”224 According to this categorization, New York State has a
local-centric level of control, a consolidated distribution of authority,
and a restricted degree of public participation.225 These characteristics
place authority “in the hands of those deemed fit to govern.”226 This
includes state structures that “harmoniz[e] the different levels of the
224. See DARA ZEEHANDELAAR ET AL., THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., SCHOOLS OF
THOUGHT: A TAXONOMY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION GOVERNANCE 54 (2015),
https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/research/schools-thought-taxonomy-american-e
ducation-governance [https://perma.cc/YJ3E-2DQ3].
225. See id. at 46.
226. Id. at 54.

356

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

education system — much as Plato’s ‘philosopher kings’ were charged
with preparing their subjects for effective citizenship.” 227 Though
based on very different organizing principles, both categorizations of
New York State’s governance note their emphasis on allocating
authority to educational experts on the statewide and local levels. This
is thought to be a central benefit of single-purpose governance.228
Drawbacks of single-purpose governance include its tendency to silo
education policymaking apart from other relevant public policy
decisions. This can foster inefficiency and establish a closed universe
resistant (or even hostile) to innovation or integrated governance. It
also may also impede more comprehensive approaches to multifarious
impacts on educational inequity and outcomes.229
General-purpose education structures situate education alongside
many policy choices faced by executives and legislatures. The benefit
of general-purpose governance placing education among other
governmental priorities is that it allows for more efficient governance
overall. This may include a broader and more inclusive understanding
of education that fosters a “multisector approach to improving
learning” equitably. 230 A major drawback of general-purpose
governance is that education easily could be subordinated to other
priorities, including business concerns and broad budgetary
imperatives.231
B. Centralized Versus Decentralized Structures

Another current trend in public school governance, particularly in
large cities, is toward centralized, mayoral control. Larger cities such
as Boston, Chicago, and New York have shifted control of their school
systems from local, elected school boards to mayors.232 In New York
227. Id.; see also HENIG, supra note 215, at 164 (notably, Henig rejected the idea
that the development of education exceptionalism can be traced to a deliberate process
involving political philosophy).
228. See HENIG, supra note 215, at 172–73.
229. See id. at 178.
230. See id. at 164.
231. See id. at 173, 179.
232. See Robert A. Garda, Jr. & David S. Doty, The Legal Impact of Emerging
Governance Models on Public Education and Its Office Holders, 45 URB. LAW. 21, 30–
31 (2013) (“In a ‘mayoral takeover’ mayors do not directly run the schools as a
superintendent but instead control the school board by appointing the members,
effectively displacing the electorate’s choice of school board composition. Over a
dozen major urban school districts permit mayors appointment power over most or all
of the school board and there is expected to be a ‘“new wave” of switches to mayoral
authority.’ While this mayor-centric approach is sometimes adopted and promoted by
local interests, more often than not it involves intervention by governors and state
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City, mayoral control, first enacted during the tenure of billionaire
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, has had significant implications for
education reform and the balance of power in education decision
making. New York City’s move to mayoral control in 2002 was a
departure from the local school board structures that govern education
for most of the state.233
Proponents argue that centralization supports both equity and
efficiency to a greater degree than local control 234 by supporting
While proponents frame
expertise and accountability. 235
centralization largely as a management tool, others see its implications
extending more broadly. For example, Henig suggests that the
rationale for and effects of mayoral control are to reconfigure “the
constellation of interest groups and political actors that has
traditionally set the agenda for local education.”236 New York City’s
experience with mayoral control thus far has demonstrated its impact
as both a management tool and a mechanism for reordering the range
of stakeholders and their influences on education policy. Indeed, one
of the most potent effects of New York City mayoral control was to
bring a range of external stakeholders (including the business
community, advocacy organizations, philanthrocapitalists, and others)
to the table, often with less-than-optimal outcomes.237
At the same time, the influence of formal governance structures is
not as straight forward as proponents suggest. For example,
centralization’s general effect on education equity is unclear,238 though
in New York City, it helped to usher in reforms that exacerbated
segregation and failed to close achievement gaps. Centralization has,

legislatures who maintain that they must take ‘extraordinary steps in order to rescue a
faltering system unable to heal itself.’ The result is typically state legislation targeted
at a specific major urban school district granting the mayor power to appoint the school
board.”).
233. See Eloise Pasachoff, Equality, Centralization, Community, and Governance in
Contemporary Education Law, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763 (2015); see also Robert
Garda, Searching for Equity Amid a System of Schools: The View from New Orleans,
42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 615 (2015).
234. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1983–84 (2008); see also Garda, Jr. & Doty,
supra note 232; Pasachoff, supra note 233.
235. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Elizabeth Cruikshank & Christina Ma,

Governance of Steel and Kryptonite Politics in Contemporary Public Education
Reform, 69 FLA. L. REV. 365, 374 (2017).
236. HENIG, supra note 215, at 146.
237. See generally Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and
Philathrocapitalism, supra note 198.
238. See Pasachoff, supra note 233, at 771.
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however, reordered the positions of education stakeholders. In this
regard, Henig refers to the concept of “governance regimes” as
perhaps more relevant than formal government institutional
structures. 239 New York City’s experience with centralization has
borne this out. The shift to mayoral control in New York City changed
the constellation of relevant constituencies, giving greater voice to the
business community and wealthy philanthropists and ushering in a
series of “business model” reforms.240
Even following a change in mayoral administrations, under
centralized control, the business community, wealthy philanthropists,
and other politically powerful constituencies continue to exercise
significant influence over the City’s public policy, which necessarily
includes public education policy.241 Indeed, it can be quite difficult to

239. See HENIG, supra note 215, at 146–47 (governance regimes include not only
formal actors “but also the informal yet patterned interactions among government,
business, unions, the nonprofit sector, and a diverse array of interest groups [that]
shape local policy priorities and the prospects for getting things accomplished”).
240. See Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform, supra note 204, at 85
(noting the introduction of “high stakes tests, school closures, and expansion of charter
schools” under mayoral control).
241. See generally David Freedlander, On Behalf of the Plutocrats: Kathy Wylde’s

Winding Path from Community Organizer to Head of the Partnership for New York
City,
CURBED
N.Y.
(Nov.
25,
2020),

https://www.curbed.com/2020/11/kathy-wylde-partnership-for-new-york-city.html
[https://perma.cc/9BJ6-3GVH] (describing the work of Kathy Wylde and the
Partnership for NYC in engaging wealthy business leaders in public policy). Kathy
Wylde also serves as Secretary of the Board for the Fund for Public Schools, a
non-profit arm of the NYC DOE that raises private corporate and philanthropic funds
to support New York City public schools. See Board of Directors, FUND FOR PUB.
SCHS.,
https://www.fundforpublicschools.org/our-board
[https://perma.cc/ESD9-FCPG] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021); Our Mission, FUND FOR PUB.
SCHS., https://www.fundforpublicschools.org/mission [https://perma.cc/VK9Q-VEV2]
(last visited Jan. 5, 2020). New York City’s business community engages in public
policy in multiple ways, including philanthropy, service in policy positions, political
action, and advocacy. For example, in September 2020, 177 wealthy business leaders
signed an open letter criticizing the Mayor’s leadership with respect to public safety,
sanitation, and re-opening businesses during the pandemic while local chambers of
commerce separately organized similar charges. See J. David Goodman, Emma G.
Fitzsimmons & Jeffrey C. Mays, Inside the Clash Between Powerful Business Leaders
and
N.Y.C.’s
Mayor,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/nyregion/coronavirus-business-nyc-reopen.html
[https://perma.cc/N95U-LB5L]. That same month, when de Blasio pushed to reopen
schools, he “took heat from all sides” and the principals union voted no confidence in
Mayor de Blasio’s handling of public school reopening. See Tommy Beer, NYC
Principals Union Unanimously Votes ‘No Confidence’ in de Blasio, FORBES (Sept. 27,
2020,
3:42
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/09/27/nyc-principals-union-unanimousl
y-votes-no-confidence-in-de-blasio/?sh=7fc5979645e1
[https://perma.cc/2HXJ-CRQF]; Eliza Shapiro, How de Blasio Backed Himself into a

2021] REIMAGINING PUBLIC EDUCATION EQUITY 359
disentangle how public education policy is influenced by private
philanthropy and the extensive web of constituencies and influences at
play with respect to education policy in a milieu of general-purpose,
centralized governance.242 Thus, for example, even though Mayor de
Blasio has positioned himself as a progressive concerned about equity
based on race, ethnicity, and class, his policy actions have been
constrained by structures and forces shaped by wealthy interests,
unions, and other powerful constituencies.243 In addition, the influence
of market models of public education remains strong, driving
education policy and practice in ways that compete with or displace
conceptions of education as an urgent public good. Shifts from singlepurpose, localized education governance to a general-purpose,
centralized model relate to competing visions of public education as a
public good, on the one hand, and as a publicly funded private
commodity on the other, with implications for public education’s role
in democracy and society.
C. The Relationship Between Governance and Market-Based Versus
Democratic Visions of Public Education

General-purpose and centralized governance structures impact the
balance of relevant constituencies driving education policy. The trend
away from education exceptionalism toward general, centralized
governance tends to support a vision of public education that
emphasizes economic concerns and considers policy through a market
competition lens. This is problematic because it strays from a
democratic vision of education, to be provided equitably and
inclusively, as a public civic good centrally important to democratic

Corner
on
Closing
Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/nyregion/deblasio-school-reopening.html
[https://perma.cc/T9J3-9SA7].
242. See generally Valerie Strauss, Bill and Melinda Gates Have Spent Billions to

Shape Education Policy. Now, They Say, They’re ‘Skeptical’ of ‘Billionaires’ Trying to
Do
Just
That.,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
10,
2020,
4:59
PM),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/02/10/bill-melinda-gates-have-spentbillions-dollars-shape-education-policy-now-they-say-theyre-skeptical-billionaires-try
ing-do-just-that/ [https://perma.cc/7TUA-C6WD].
243. For example, despite long-stated commitments to tackle school segregation,
Mayor de Blasio’s recently announced plan to change selective school admissions
policies that contribute to segregation will take place during his last year as Mayor
because it has faced fierce opposition from parents and others invested in the current
system and its notions of competition. See Eliza Shapiro, New York City Will Change
Many Selective Schools to Address Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/18/nyregion/nyc-schools-admissions-segregation.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/C8E3-LB7E].
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governance. 244 As the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Board of
Education,
[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.245

This longstanding, if largely unrealized, vision of public education as
a common endeavor and a public good is critically important for equity
purposes. Public education must be considered a public good that is
crucial to society as a whole if the goal of equal access for all is to be
achieved. “The production, provision, and governance of public goods
represent a crucial front line in the legal construction of the privileges
and immunities of citizenship, understood here not as a matter of
constitutional doctrine but as a matter of lived reality.”246
This is not to say that only single-purpose, locally based education
governance can achieve public goals. It does require that any
governance structure give attention to the societal purposes of
education as a public good rather than a private commodity paid for
with public funds. It also requires public law norms be applied in public
school governance. The ascendance of market models of education 247
(and more broadly privatization of public goods) presents significant
governance challenges, including competition among constituencies
and schools, and over access to public funds. Education governance,

244. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“We have recognized ‘the
public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government.’” (quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963))).
245. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
246. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through
the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2451 (2018).
247. See Daniel Kiel, The Endangered School District: The Promise and Challenge
of Redistributing Control of Public Education, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 352 (2013).
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whether general purpose, single purpose, or otherwise, must remain
true to public law norms and values.248
D. The Overlay of Public Health Emergency Governance
During COVID-19

Consideration of public school governance in the COVID-19
context requires consideration of public health emergency law and
governance. As noted throughout this Article, public health concerns
are and have been the priority in school reopening decisions. The need
to prevent and slow transmission of the virus led to school closures,
quarantine, mask requirements, and facilities requirements to ensure
adequate space, ventilation, and cleaning. Public health emergency
prerogatives also impacted public information and responses to the
pandemic.
Accordingly, the impact of education law and governance must be
viewed in the larger context of the wider system of the public health
emergency response. A range of factors and actors are involved in
emergency governance outside of the formal education policy
governance and legal infrastructure. Nongovernmental actors (such as
nonprofit organizations), private corporations (including hospitals and
pharmaceutical companies), and volunteers may play key roles in
providing services and support during a public health emergency, yet
these roles may not be formally recognized by the emergency response
infrastructure. Furthermore, these actors are regulated and influenced
by a wider set of laws, social traditions, and economic factors that exert
control and pressure on their actions. Thus, while it can be said that
law is the most influential factor in governing a public health
emergency, numerous other factors measurably affect governance as
well.249
The COVID-19 emergency and its relationship to school reopening
necessarily implicate general-purpose governance. It also highlights a
need to focus public health governance on public law norms and the
equitable distribution of an important social good that affects all

248. See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Why Matter of Devera Matters: Universal Pre-k,
Quality, Oversight, and the Need to Restore Public Values in New York Statutory
Interpretation, 23 CUNY L. REV. 238, 278 (2020) (“The language of ‘public law values’

is used here to refer to basic values of fairness, equality, expertise, competence, and
adherence to the rule of law, all of which hold government agencies accountable and
work in favor of the greatest common good.”).
249. See Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses
Through Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 399–401 (2012).
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aspects of life.250 The current struggles over how to implement public
health and safety guidance during the reopening and running of public
schools in New York City reveal the many fault lines between singleand general-purpose governance, formal and informal governance, and
tensions between public and private influences on education decision
making. It also revealed key benefits and drawbacks of a mixed system
of government involving federalism, state, and local control of
education.
IV. RE-OPENING AND RE-IMAGINING PROPOSALS: LAW,
GOVERNANCE, GRANDSTANDING, AND PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE POWER

Public school closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and
plans for reopening schools have become a political flashpoint and
have presented significant governance, policy, planning, and
implementation challenges. As the pandemic continues, policymakers
face multiple concerns driven by the interests and agendas of myriad
stakeholders at a time of uncertainty and significant public mistrust.
Discussion and debate about whether and how best to reopen schools
amid a continuing pandemic, where U.S. infection and transmission
rates are among the highest in the world,251 have dominated COVID19 policy planning and the news cycle throughout the spring and
summer of 2020. Schools in some states reopened in August 2020 and
then closed again following spikes in COVID-19 infections.252 Other
school districts opted for continued distance learning for the fall 2020
semester despite concerns about its efficacy and impact on equity and
expanding achievement gaps.253
New York City’s spring 2020 COVID-19 distance learning
experience was quite mixed. While many praised the City’s quick
250. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A
New Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 792 (2020)

(“[H]ealth is not just an individual good; it is distinctively a public good, too.”).
251. See Soo Kim, U.S. Coronavirus Cases Have Been Highest in the World for 6
Months,
NEWSWEEK
(Sept.
26,
2020,
6:09
AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/coronavirus-most-cases-worldwide-1534421
[https://perma.cc/7MU3-WYBY].
252. See Tawnell D. Hobbs, Schools Are Reopening, Then Quickly Closing Due to
Coronavirus Outbreaks, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2020, 5:48 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/schools-are-reopening-then-quickly-closing-due-to-coro
navirus-outbreaks-11597700886 [https://perma.cc/ZF5Y-BRPU].
253. See, e.g., Tracey Tully, Why New Jersey’s Plan for In-Person Schooling Is
Falling
Apart,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/nyregion/nj-coronavirus-schools-reopening.html
[https://perma.cc/W3V4-XDDJ].
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transition to remote learning, distance education exposed and
reinforced deep inequities in public schooling related to longstanding
socioeconomic inequality in New York City. By the end of the school
year, studies showed learning loss and widening socioeconomic
achievement gaps.254 The summer of 2020 brought arrangements for
summer school distance learning in New York City as well as questions
about how to plan for school reopening in the fall. Fall 2020 reopening
plans raised significant questions about governance, leadership, and
responsibility. COVID-19 had a starkly disproportionate negative
impact on communities of color and those facing the greatest
socioeconomic marginalization. The closure of schools and the move
to distance learning compounded the harms of double segregation and
inequity, widening disparities across New York City’s public schools.
In April 2020, New York education leaders and government officials
began planning for school reopening in the coming fall. The reopening
plans exemplified various governance approaches as well as the scope
and limits of education actors’ powers to influence and implement safe,
effective, and equitable school reopening amid the continuing and
uncertain trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic. This Part addresses
State and City efforts to reopen schools, placing such efforts within
governance models and examining their implications for equity and
inclusion of stakeholder voices.
A. Regents’s Reopening Plan

i. Education-Focused Task Force on Reopening to Develop
Rules and Guidance
On April 29, 2020, New York State Board of Regents Chancellor
Betty Rosa announced plans to form a task force to determine how to
reopen New York City schools successfully and appropriately.255 In

254. See, e.g., Emma Dorn et al., COVID-19 and Student Learning in the United
States: The Hurt Could Last a Lifetime, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 1, 2020),

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/covid-19-a
nd-student-learning-in-the-united-states-the-hurt-could-last-a-lifetime
[https://perma.cc/49SA-CTEW] (“Data . . . suggest that only 60 percent of low-income
students are regularly logging into online instruction; 90 percent of high-income
students do. Engagement rates are also lagging behind in schools serving
predominantly black and Hispanic students; just 60 to 70 percent are logging in
regularly . . . .”); see also Dana Goldstein, Research Shows Students Falling Months
Behind During Virus Disruptions, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/coronavirus-education-lost-learning.html
[https://perma.cc/3FE9-G8VU].
255. See Press Release, supra note 5.
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the announcement, Chancellor Rosa noted that, “[t]hroughout the
pandemic, we have seen many examples of how schools across the state
serve as the cornerstone of our communities, which is why it is
imperative that they are included in any reopening strategy.”256 The
task force would include “educational leaders, including
superintendents, principals, teachers, parents, school board members
and other stakeholders, to guide the reopening of our schools.”257
The Board of Regents and State Education Department Regional
Reopening Task Force (Task Force) members were announced on
June 8, 2020. The Task Force was created to help the Regents and
NYSED receive input from parents, teachers, school and district
leaders, non-instructional staff, school board members, health experts,
and other interested parties from every region of the State. 258 The
Task Force structured its work around four regional meetings
throughout New York State. NYSED also held a virtual Youth Forum,
which over 100 students from across the state attended. 259 The
students spoke about their remote learning experience and proposed
creative solutions to improve their educational experience going
forward. Those meetings informed the Regents and NYSED’s work in
developing regulatory changes and guidance to support school
reopening. Each regional task force provided input in nine different
areas: health and safety; teaching and learning; social-emotional needs;
special education; bilingual and multilingual education; digital equity
and access; budget and finances; transportation, facilities, and
nutrition; and staffing and human resources.260 The Task Force used

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Reopening Schools: Recover, Rebuild and Renew the Spirit of Our
Schools, N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, http://www.nysed.gov/reopening-schools
[https://perma.cc/6T28-AUPW] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
259. See N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, RECOVERING, REBUILDING, AND RENEWING:
THE SPIRIT OF NEW YORK’S SCHOOLS 6 (2020) [hereinafter REOPENING GUIDANCE],
http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/programs/reopening-schools/nys-p12-scho
ol-reopening-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DN-RCCK].
260. See id. at 4–5 (“Each regional meeting included more than 350 experts and
stakeholders from health and education fields. In all, more than 1,650 parents, students,
teachers, administrators, school board members, and stakeholders, representing New
York’s diversity, attended and provided valuable feedback.”). The Author was invited
to participate and participated in the June 24, 2020, Regional Task Force meeting and
its Teaching and Learning breakout session. For descriptions and online recordings of
the Regents Regional Task Force meetings, see Regional Task Force Meetings, N.Y.
ST.
EDUC.
DEP’T,
http://www.nysed.gov/reopening-schools/regional-task-force-meetings
[https://perma.cc/32ME-5RXT] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020). See also Board of Regents
and State Education Department Announce Regional Reopening Task Force Meeting,
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input from the structured regional meetings to craft regulations and
guidance for school reopening across New York State. The regulations
and guidance prioritized health and safety concerns, including the
social and emotional needs of students and those who engage them.
While deferring to New York State Department of Health (DOH)
guidelines for health and safety, the NYSED guidance gives close
attention to particular concerns involving schools, including achieving
social distancing in a school setting, handling persons who become ill,
and considering specific needs for school facilities, student nutrition,
transportation, and scheduling.261
The Regents and NYSED reopening guidance also brings attention
to social-emotional wellbeing as key to effective teaching and learning.
Recognizing widespread trauma related to the pandemic and the
importance of robust teacher-student relationships, the guidance calls
for counseling plans, mental health support systems, and traumaresponsive practices.262 The guidance also gives attention to practical
concerns like scheduling, budgeting, attendance, technology, and
connectivity. It considers equity imperatives, including appropriate
support for ELLs, multi-lingual learners,263 students with interrupted
formal education, students with disabilities, and other vulnerable
populations. With respect to each of these populations, the guidance
prioritizes the “health, safety, and well-being of the children and adults
in . . . schools.” 264 The guidance calls for developing plans for
identifying student needs for “additional social, emotional, or
academic support.”265 It requires “continuity of learning plans” that
prepare for in-person, remote, and hybrid models of instruction.266 It
also emphasizes the importance of both clear guidance and the
flexibility to present local solutions. 267 While providing general
direction for local school districts to follow the guidance, it addresses
specific issues that arise in various school settings.
N.Y.
ST.
EDUC.
DEP’T
(June
8,
2020),
http://www.nysed.gov/news/2020/board-regents-and-state-education-department-ann
ounce-regional-reopening-task-force [https://perma.cc/EC8M-9H35].
261. See generally REOPENING GUIDANCE, supra note 259.
262. See id. at 56–74.
263. See OFF. OF BILINGUAL EDUC. & WORLD LANGUAGES, N.Y. STATE EDUC.
DEP’T, BLUEPRINT FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNER/MULTILINGUAL LEARNER
SUCCESS
1,
http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/nys-blueprint-for-ell-success.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8SR-22DN] (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
264. REOPENING GUIDANCE, supra note 259, at 6.
265. Id. at 90; see also id. at 64.
266. See id. at 89.
267. See id. at 6.
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ii. Regents Approach — Single Purpose, De-Centralized,
and Inclusive
The Regents and NYSED’s approach to school reopening planning,
regulation, and implementation demonstrated several benefits of
single-purpose governance. Primary among these are the focuses on
education, the practical and theoretical expertise about pedagogy and
educational delivery, and an understanding of the importance of
meaningful stakeholder inclusion in education decisionmaking. In
addition to including a wide variety of education stakeholders, the
Regents and NYSED worked closely with the New York State DOH
on directives for school reopening that were based on scientific and
public health principles.
The guidelines were consistent with
information provided for reopening other public buildings and
managing individual and community health in public spaces. Thus, the
Regents and NYSED’s approach in developing guidance exemplified
several benefits of single-purpose governance, with few drawbacks
related to engagement with broader state planning efforts.
B. Governor’s Reopening and Reimagining Plans

i. Reimagining Education While Managing the Pandemic
On May 5, 2020, Governor Cuomo announced a plan in
collaboration with the Gates Foundation to “reimagine education”
based on how the COVID-19 pandemic had shown “how unprepared
the country was for such a transition.”268 His description of the Task
Force and its focus contrasted sharply with those of the Task Force
Chancellor Rosa announced:
When does change come to a society? Because we all talk about
change and advancement, but really we like control, and we like the
status quo, and it’s hard to change the status quo . . . . But you get
moments in history where people say, “Okay, I’m ready. I’m ready
for change. I get it.” I think this is one of those moments. And I
think education, as well as other topics, is a topic where people will
say, “Look, I’ve been reflecting, I’ve been thinking, I learned a lot.”
We all learned a lot about how vulnerable we are and how much we
have to do, and let’s start talking about really revolutionizing
education. And it’s about time.269

268. Strauss, supra note 2.
269. Id.
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The Governor’s announcement centered on his and Bill Gates’s view
of what needed to be done to reimagine education, along with a
relatively small, hand-picked group of Task Force members.
The announcement drew immediate ire — mostly because of the
Gates partnership.270 Critics of partnership with the Gates Foundation
noted the Foundation’s backing of several failed and roundly
disparaged public school “reform” efforts, including the rushed
Common Core State Standards project and a failed cloud-based school
technology initiative that risked student privacy and security. 271
Educators and parents also expressed concern about the Gates
Foundation’s past failures in shaping education in several school
districts, its crucial role in developing the Common Core academic
standards, and its role in the nationwide linking of student test scores
to teacher evaluations. 272 Among several New York educators and
education advocates, the Gates Foundation is infamously regarded as
one of the drivers of “teaching to the test,” which has “withered arts
education, health and sex ed, social studies, and other subjects the
Common Core devalues.”273
Governor Cuomo also was criticized for his exclusion of educators
and other key stakeholders from the Task Force, particularly snubbing
New York City teachers, parents, and education leaders who were then
at the United States’ epicenter of the pandemic. 274 The exclusions
were especially egregious given Governor Cuomo’s stated intent to
“develop a blueprint to reimagine education in the new normal.”275 At

270. See, e.g., Anne McCloy, Parents, Teachers Unions Concerned After Cuomo’s
Comments on Bill Gates, Distance Learning, 6 NEWS ALBANY (May 8, 2020),

https://cbs6albany.com/news/coronavirus/parents-teachers-unions-concerned-after-cu
omos-comments-on-bill-gates-distance-learning
[https://perma.cc/BR4L-2NQY];
Johanna Miller, Bill Gates Shouldn’t Be the One ‘Reimagining’ NY’s Public
N.Y.C.L.
UNION
(May
8,
2020,
1:45
PM),
Education,
https://www.nyclu.org/en/news/bill-gates-shouldnt-be-one-reimagining-nys-public-edu
cation [https://perma.cc/D2J8-PMQK].
271. See Miller, supra note 270.
272. See Gomez-Velez, Common Core State Standards and Philathrocapitalism,
supra note 198, at 184–85; see also Dave Lucas, Educators React to Cuomo’s
“Reimagine
Education”
Plan,
WAMC
(May
12,
2020),
https://www.wamc.org/post/educators-react-cuomos-reimagine-education-plan
[https://perma.cc/FU4X-CMB8].
273. Miller, supra note 270.
274. See Reema Amin, Cuomo’s Gates-Led ‘Reimagine’ Schools Bid Snubs Current
CITY
(May
10,
2020,
12:10
PM),
NYC
Teachers,
Parents,
https://www.thecity.nyc/education/2020/5/10/21257166/cuomo-s-gates-led-reimagine-s
chools-bid-snubs-current-nyc-teachers-parents [https://perma.cc/E4LJ-F4V4].
275. Alejandra O’Connell-Domenech, City Hall Snubbed from Seats on Governor’s
‘Reimagine
Education’
Schools
Council,
AMNY
(May
8,
2020),
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the time of his announcement, Cuomo did not provide details as to the
scope or aim of the State’s work with the Gates Foundation. Instead,
he posed a number of questions that would drive the Foundation’s
work, including “‘[w]here can we use technology to provide more
opportunity to students no matter where they are?’ and ‘[h]ow can we
use technology to meet educational needs of students with
disabilities?’”276 The Gates Foundation’s Director of K–12 Education
provided little detail about its specific role in reopening New York’s
education system and said the Foundation had been supporting other
education partners in “expanding online learning . . . for K–12
students, and helping lessen the financial shock felt disproportionately
by low-income college students due to lost housing, food, and
wages.”277
Some education experts believed that the proposal “focused too
heavily on technology, overlooking the value of in-person education
and supporting students’ growing social and emotional needs as the
state recovers.”278 Others feared that, by strengthening technology in
learning, Cuomo “was looking for ways to supplant some in-person
teaching.” 279 New York State United Teachers President Andy
Pallotta said that the State should focus on other issues, such as the
need for social workers, mental health counselors, school nurses, and
smaller class sizes.280
New York State educators also expressed concern that New York
City school officials were excluded from the Governor’s plan to craft
guidelines to “reimagine education.” Soon after this announcement,
Cuomo announced the names of those appointed to the advisory

https://www.amny.com/education-2/city-hall-snubbed-from-seats-on-governors-reima
gine-education-schools-council/ [https://perma.cc/JC2P-UT54].
276. Evie Blad, New York State Teams with Gates Foundation to ‘Reimagine
Education’ Amid Pandemic, EDUC. WK. (May 5, 2020, 4:43 PM) (quoting Governor
Cuomo),
https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2020/05/new-york-gates-coronaviruseducation.html [https://perma.cc/L2VG-RLJ4].
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Reema Amin, No Current NYC Educators Named to Cuomo’s ‘Reimagine
Education’
Council,
CHALKBEAT
(May
8,
2020,
5:47
PM),
https://ny.chalkbeat.org/2020/5/8/21252576/no-current-nyc-educators-named-to-cuom
os-reimagine-education-council [https://perma.cc/N85H-EXHS].
280. See NYSUT Statement on Governor’s Comments About Reimagining
Education,
NYSUT
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.nysut.org/news/2020/may/media-release-schools
[https://perma.cc/58VF-X6PP].
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team.281 Members ranged from the former New York City schools’
Chancellor under former Mayor Michael Bloomberg to district
superintendents outside New York City to the president of SUNY’s
student assembly. 282 However, unlike the Regents’s regional task
forces, Governor Cuomo’s council did not include “any K–12 students
or any current teachers, principals, parents, district leaders, or
administrators from the New York City Department of Education”
even though one-third of students in the State attend a New York City
public school.283 Furthermore, the Governor’s Reimagine Education
Advisory Council coordinated with the DOH rather than the DOE.
This prompted some concerns that the Council would just allow for the
“protection of old policies and personnel,” avoiding the systemic
changes necessary to face the pandemic’s challenges.284 It reflected,
however, an attempt by the Governor to use his public health powers
to influence education policy.
On July 13, the DOH, in concert with Cuomo’s Reimagine
Education Advisory Council, released an interim guidance for the
State to reopen its public schools.285 The guidance document focused
primarily on COVID-19 public health protocols (e.g., mask wearing
and social distancing) as applied to schools, including transportation,
food service, aftercare, and extracurricular activities.286
Nonetheless, embedded in the reopening guidance was an effort by
the Governor to set education policy through his Reimagine Education
Advisory Council. In some ways, the Governor’s effort to influence

281. See Amid Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, Governor Cuomo Announces
Members of the Reimagine Education Advisory Council, N.Y. ST.: GOVERNOR

ANDREW
M.
CUOMO
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuom
o-announces-members-reimagine-education-advisory [https://perma.cc/JL6J-8BBN].
282. See id.
283. See Amin, supra note 279.
284. See Bob McManus, Rhetorical Camouflage on Education, CITY J. (May 11,
2020),
https://www.city-journal.org/governor-cuomo-reimagine-education-advisory-council
[https://perma.cc/2A4C-L6D6].
285. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR IN-PERSON
INSTRUCTION AT PRE-K TO GRADE 12 SCHOOLS DURING THE COVID-19 PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY (Aug. 26, 2020) [hereinafter DOH INTERIM GUIDANCE].
286. See Kaitlin Lyle, Area Schools Try to Answer the Big Question: Should New
York Schools Reopen Come Fall with COVID Concerns?, TRICORNERNEWS (July 22,
2020),
https://tricornernews.com/millerton-news-regional/area-schools-try-answer-big-questi
on-should-new-york-schools-reopen-come [https://perma.cc/2GAY-LHF6].
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education policy is not surprising. 287 Governor Cuomo’s decision
ultimately to incorporate the Reimagine Education Advisory Council’s
findings and recommendations into the DOH’s interim guidance may
indicate a recognition of the Council’s lack of authority to shape
education policy as well as the unpopularity of the initiative and the
Gates partnership.
The Governor announced guidelines for school reopening in the
summer of 2020 that included both the Regents and NYSED guidance
and the DOH’s data-driven plans to guide school reopening.288 Since
the initial school reopening announcements, the Governor has based
decisions about whether and how schools open or close amid the
pandemic on testing and data about community spread.289 Thus, the
287. See Bakeman, supra note 182. New York law’s allocation of education policy
authority to an independent Education Department under the Board of Regents has
been a sore point for Governor Cuomo and several of his predecessors. For example,
at an event in 2014 Cuomo said, “I wish I could say I run education in this state. I
don’t . . . . It’s run by the Board of Regents . . . . I don’t even appoint anyone to the
Board of Regents.” Id. The Regents’s independent authority over New York State
education has created some tensions with the Governor. In his bid for re-election in
2014, for example, Cuomo presented an aggressive education agenda and vowed “to
break what is in essence one of the only remaining public monopolies.” Valerie Strauss,
Cuomo Calls Public School System a ‘Monopoly’ He Wants to Bust, WASH. POST (Oct.
29,
2014,
4:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/10/29/cuomo-calls-publi
c-school-system-a-monopoly-he-wants-to-bust/
[https://perma.cc/XS7S-B9W7].
Despite these promises though, Cuomo was unable to wrest control of education policy
from the Regents.
Abolishing the Board of Regents altogether, so the education department
would report to the governor’s office instead, would be difficult. It would
require a constitutional amendment, which means it would have to be passed
twice by the Legislature in successive terms and then approved by the public
in a referendum.
Bakeman, supra note 182.
288. See Cuomo Unveils Guidelines for Reopening NY Schools; Will Announce
NBC
N.Y.
(July
13,
2020,
1:46
PM),
Decision
in
August,
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/coronavirus/cuomo-unveils-guidelines-for-reopen
ing-ny-schools-will-announce-decision-in-august/2513211/
[https://perma.cc/Y9EU-TXR9].
289. Nonetheless, on occasion Governor Cuomo has continued to express his
concern for and flex his control over public schools. For example, as part of his October
2020 announcement in response to a spike in cases, Cuomo said, “[m]y number one
concern has always been schools. I said to the parents of this state, I will not allow your
child to be sent to any school that I would not send my child, period. And you have my
personal word on that.” Governor Cuomo Updates New Yorkers on State’s Progress
During COVID-19 Pandemic, N.Y. ST.: GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Oct. 5,
2020),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-updates-new-yorkers-states-prog
ress-during-covid-19-pandemic-41 [https://perma.cc/PD5K-VCFZ].
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Governor’s school reopening plan centered primarily on public health
indicators, including infection rates and the degree of community
spread. Still, the Governor continued to spar with Mayor de Blasio
regarding closures and other virus-related directives. 290 In October
2020, in response to a spike in cases in several New York City
neighborhoods, the Governor overrode Mayor de Blasio’s decision to
order business and school closures in certain zip codes.291 Instead, the
Governor ordered closures in the same neighborhoods, but according
to zones related to the clusters of increased rates of COVID-19
infection.292 This highlights not only the complexity of state and city
public health governance, but also the degree to which politics drives
general-purpose governing.

ii. Governor’s Approach — General Purpose, Centralized Power,
Economic Focus, and Private Influence
Governor Cuomo’s public health approach to school reopening
provided important guidance based on current scientific understanding
of COVID-19 and the public health implications relevant to reopening
schools. It focused on ways to identify cases early and minimize
community spread. It considered public health concerns involving
school buildings and provided guidance. Its guidance, however, was
general and coordinated with NYSED’s rules and guidance. Concrete
reopening plans were left to the local school districts. DOH requested
school reopening plans be submitted to it and NYSED that, “at
minimum, cover[]: (1) Reopening of school facilities for in-person
instruction, (2) Monitoring of health conditions, (3) Containment of
potential transmission of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19), and
(4) Closure of school facilities and in-person instruction, if necessitated
by widespread virus transmission.”293
The DOH interim guidance identifies responsible parties, including
school district superintendents, their designees, heads of schools, or

290. See David Giambusso, Sally Goldenberg & Amanda Eisenberg, ‘It Is Not
Acceptable’: Cuomo, de Blasio at Odds as COVID Surges in New York, POLITICO

(Oct.
5,
2020,
10:34
PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/10/05/it-is-not-acceptable
-cuomo-de-blasio-at-odds-as-covid-surges-in-new-york-1321450
[https://perma.cc/3W3G-NHT7].
291. See Associated Press, WATCH: New York Gov. Cuomo Gives COVID-19 and
School Reopening Updates, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 6, 2020, 4:43 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/watch-new-york-gov-cuomo-gives-covid-19and-school-reopening-updates [https://perma.cc/K2RJ-DDJC].
292. See id.
293. DOH INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 285, at 1.
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others in charge, to prepare and submit reopening plans.294 DOH’s
interim guidance includes among its core principles ensuring
appropriate personal protective equipment (primarily face coverings),
social distancing protocols and procedures, density reduction plans, the
prioritization of in-person instruction, and using “cohorts” and other
methods to limit COVID-19 exposure.295 The interim guidance also
requires schools to implement mandatory health screenings and
contact tracing as part of their reopening plans, as well as protocols and
procedures detailing requirements for return to school after a positive
COVID-19 test. 296 The guidance then sets forth parameters and
requires school reopening plans to address transportation, food
services, ventilation, hygiene, and cleaning and disinfection, among
other physical plant protocols.297 The DOH interim guidance provides
an example of several benefits of general-purpose governance, such as
“mobilizing and coordinating resources and knowledge across a
broader range of government” and establishing priorities among
competing concerns amid resource constraints.298 To the extent the
DOH guidance addresses foundational public health concerns that
apply to educational institutions as well as other public facilities and
endeavors to provide consistent, health- and science-based parameters,
it is an example of effective general-purpose governance within the
Governor’s purview.
The interim guidance strays, however, in moving beyond its focus on
public health concerns that intersect with school reopening to issuing
education policy recommendations. This is where Governor Cuomo’s
“reimagine education” initiative appears to seek authority and a place
on the agenda. For example, the guidance says:
On May 8, 2020, Governor Cuomo launched New York’s Reimagine
Education Advisory Council — made up of educators, students,
parents, and education leaders — to help school districts, colleges,
and universities reimagine teaching and learning as they prepare to
reopen while protecting the health and safety of students and
educators. The collective expertise and experience of this advisory
council helped address key questions about how to strengthen New
York’s entire education system and helped inform this guidance.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See id. at 1.
See id. at 1–3.
See id. at 2–3.
See id. at 3–6.
Henig, supra note 215, at 17–18.
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Specifically, this distinguished Council recommended . . . key
principles, which are reflected throughout these guidelines . . . .299

Most of the principles reflected in the DOH interim guidance
emanate from either broader public health guidance issued by the
World Health Organization and the CDC or are consistent with the
guidance issued by NYSED following its Reopening Task Force
recommendations, rulemaking, and guidance documents.300
C. New York City Mayor’s Plan

i. Planning School Reopening with the Entire City in Mind in an
Education-Focused System
In May 2020, Mayor de Blasio announced the creation of a series of
sector advisory councils, including a 45-member education advisory
council, to “serve as critical links to disseminate information about reopening and provide guidance to shape the City’s response to the
COVID-19 pandemic”301 and to “guide New York City in reopening
school buildings.”302
New York City’s plans were subject to state approval prior to
reopening. New York City issued a survey to parents and students
requesting they choose whether to enroll in full-time remote learning
or default to an in-person or hybrid learning model, and register their
choice with the DOE in the summer of 2020.303 While reports of the

299. DOH INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 285, at 8.
300. See id.
301. Mayor de Blasio Appoints Members to Sector Advisory Councils, OFF.
MAYOR,
CITY
OF
N.Y.
(May
8,
2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/332-20/mayor-de-blasio-appoints-me
mbers-sector-advisory-councils [https://perma.cc/6ZVS-6CX9].
302. Annalise Knudson, These 45 Education Experts Will Advise NYC on
SILIVE.COM
(May
22,
2020),
Reopening
Schools,
https://www.silive.com/coronavirus/2020/05/these-45-education-experts-will-advise-ny
c-on-reopening-schools.html [https://perma.cc/843G-EX5X].
303. See Madina Touré, Parents, Teachers Say de Blasio Is Downplaying Real
Concerns over Schools, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2020, 05:03 AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/08/14/parents-teachers-sa
y-de-blasio-is-downplaying-serious-concerns-over-schools-1308667
[https://perma.cc/U7HF-5EHK].
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survey’s methodology and results were hotly contested,304 it indicated
that a number of parents expressed interest in in-person learning.305
The Mayor’s school reopening plan stated an emphasis on health
and safety. It is a hybrid distance-learning and in-person schooling
plan. Much of it is focused on logistics to ensure physical distancing,
manage capacity, hygiene, cleaning, and disinfection, as well as
procedures for monitoring, containment, contact tracing, and plans for
school closures, should the virus spread.306 The plan gives guidance on
nuts-and-bolts issues, including facilities, nutrition, and transportation.
It gives some attention to social-emotional well-being, referencing
counseling and providing guidance on and procedures for school
scheduling models, attendance, technology, continuity of learning,
special education, multilingual learners, and staffing. However, the
plan mostly provides only general guidance and does not address
concerns about available staff and resources to enable school districts
and individual schools to carry it out. Nor is it clear whether school
districts and schools have the resources to carry out the reopening plan
as envisioned. Given competing concerns and logistical and budget
constraints, New York City school leaders struggled mightily with
planning and executing the particulars of fall 2020 school reopening.307
Teachers and principals unions expressed concerns over inadequate
facilities planning, staffing support, and logistical planning to ensure
safe and effective reopening. In the wake of concerns raised by
parents, teachers, and principals, and a strike threat by the teachers
union,308 the initial plan to reopen on September 10, 2020, was delayed

304. See Elizabeth Kim, De Blasio Says Survey Shows Most NYC Public School
Children Will Return to In-Person Instruction, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 10, 2020, 12:39 PM),

https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-public-school-children-expected-return-person-instru
ction [https://perma.cc/D9XS-Z9K5].
305. For example, according to the plan, the survey found that “53% of parents feel
very or mostly comfortable sending their child back to school. 24% feel a little
comfortable and 22% feel not at all comfortable.” 2020–2021 New York City

Department of Education’s School Reopening Plan Submission to the New York State
Department of Education, N.Y.C. DEP’T. EDUCATION 10 (2020),

https://cdn-blob-prd.azureedge.net/prd-pws/docs/default-source/default-document-lib
rary/2020-nycdoe-reopeningplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL9A-6ANK].
306. See id. at 15–34.
307. See id.
308. See Elizabeth Kim, De Blasio and NYC Teachers Union Are Heading Toward
a Showdown over School Reopenings. Who Will Blink First?, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 30,
2020,
5:49
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/de-blasio-and-nyc-teachers-union-are-heading-toward-sh
owdown-over-school-reopenings-who-will-blink-first [https://perma.cc/FZX3-XJAF].
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twice. New York City’s schools achieved staggered reopening as of
October 1, 2020.309

ii. New York City Mayor’s Approach — General Purpose,
Centralized, and Local Under State Control
In planning for school reopening, New York City’s DOE had to
follow the DOH and NYSED reopening rules and guidance. Within
those parameters, the DOE, centralized under mayoral control, issued
its reopening plan.
The process in New York City exemplified some of the benefits and
drawbacks of its mayoral control governance structure as well as the
operation of school “governance regimes” influencing education
policymaking beyond formal governance.
A prime benefit is
accountability. The Mayor and Chancellor are clearly responsible for
the schools. Mayoral control prevents the kind of finger pointing and
diffusion of responsibility that once plagued New York City schools.
Another benefit is coordination with public health, transportation, and
other agencies in planning school reopening.
A downside of centralized control is the effect, as in single-purpose
governance, of having education decisions and policymaking compete
with the broad range of interests and concerns facing the City,
particularly during a public health and fiscal emergency when resource
competition is at its most intense. This is a particular concern for public
education given the current climate in which privatization is in
ascendance, and there is a risk that wealthy private interests will take
precedence over public interests and goals in setting policy. 310 As
noted above, centralized mayoral control in New York City brought
with it a slew of market model reforms. Similarly, the federal
government’s inept response to the pandemic so as not to upset the
markets, the President’s tweeted declarations that “SCHOOLS MUST
OPEN IN THE FALL!!!” 311 to serve his political and business
interests, and Education Secretary DeVos’s bald-faced attempts to use
the pandemic to accelerate her education privatization agenda
demonstrate a powerful and concerted push to have public education
serve private market interests. This is why Governor Cuomo’s
proposal to reimagine education with the Gates Foundation was
309. See Shapiro & Zaveri, supra note 107.
310. See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.
311. See Eliza Shapiro, How Trump’s Push to Reopen Schools Backfired, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/trump-schools-reopen.html
[https://perma.cc/TS92-UL25].
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received with such alarm. One of the only things slowing his proposal
is the structure of education governance in New York.
D. Education Governance for Equity — Observations from
New York’s COVID-19 Experience Thus Far

Determining the most appropriate governance mechanisms to
ensure effective and equitable public education requires consideration
of multiple factors and consulting history. 312 While single-purpose
education governance is in decline across the country, it remains a key
structure in New York State. Despite trends toward general-purpose
governance, Henig does not project the end of special-purpose
education governance. 313 Instead, he observes its slow erosion over
time as more school systems are absorbed into general-purpose and
centralized governance models.314
New York’s experience with school governance amid the pandemic
supports the argument in favor of preserving single-purpose
governance on the statewide level and perhaps on the local level as
well. The Regents’s approach to school reopening exemplified many
of the theoretical benefits of single-purpose education. It included a
range of key stakeholders with education expertise to help craft
guidance that considered substantive education issues, including
equity, the inclusion of all students, and the importance of socialemotional learning as part of reopening plans. The Regents’s plan also
gave attention to practical issues — like transportation, meals, staffing,
as well as local variation across the State and built-in flexibility in its
responses, while coordinating with the DOH and following developing
scientific understanding of COVID-19 from state and federal experts.
The Regents’s approach contrasted sharply with Governor Cuomo’s
impulse to use the pandemic as an opportunity to reimagine education
and to absorb education policymaking into his general-purpose
pandemic response. The most striking contrast in the Governor’s
approach is his proposal to involve the Gates Foundation before
engaging in any meaningful consultation with education experts in the
state. This set off alarm bells for many teachers, school leaders, and
education advocates precisely because of their experience with reforms
driven by the Gates Foundation and other private entities seeking to
influence education policy, and in some instances, to profit from
education privatization.

312. See generally Taylor, supra note 200.
313. See HENIG, supra note 215, at 171.
314. See id.
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To the extent that the Governor’s reimagine education proposal
portends what general-purpose education governance might look like
in New York State, it may serve as a clarion call to preserve New
York’s single-purpose structure, no matter how anomalous. The
Regents and NYSED’s efforts on the state level and their guidance to
local school districts heavily emphasized issues of equity, and a
reopening response that closely considered the multiple impacts that
COVID-19 has had on students, teachers, families, communities, and
school leaders.315 The response exemplified many of the theoretical
benefits of single-purpose governance.
To be sure, the pandemic called for a multisector approach. It might
be argued, therefore, that the COVID-19 experience, with its need for
government to coordinate a response across sectors, argues for
general-purpose education governance. Yet, both the Governor’s and
Mayor’s responses to school closure and reopening demonstrated little
to be gained from a general-purpose, centralized education governance
structure. Indeed, thus far, the voices that most accurately identified
key concerns and problems with distance learning and school
reopening and effective methods for resolving them have been those
of educators heeding the guidance of health experts and applying it to
the realities of public schooling in New York. For example, much of
the rush to reopen schools was in response to pressure from business
interests based on economic concerns. Though it is true that in-person
instruction is clearly preferable to distance learning, careful planning
focused on the needs of students, staff, and parents was needed for
successful reopening.
For purposes of equity, the larger issue is whether any governance
arrangement can shield public education policymaking from forces
associated with extreme segregation and an expanding wealth gap.
Pressures toward education privatization — from wealthy
philanthrocapitalists, the corporate sector, and government actors who
share their goals — impact all forms of education governance.316 As
New York City’s experience with mayoral control under both Mayor
Bloomberg and Mayor de Blasio demonstrates, centralized control of
the schools exposes school policymaking to wealthy business interests
and corporate models. This is largely because general-purpose
governance places education governance under the purview of

315. See supra notes 258–268 and accompanying text.
316. See Gayle Greene, Ed Tech Cashes in on the Pandemic, AM. PROSPECT (Aug.
10,
2020),
https://prospect.org/education/ed-tech-cashes-in-on-the-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/U3NW-PVKK].
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executives who are more directly mindful of politics and more
beholden to wealthy interests.317
To be sure, single-purpose governance is not immune to political
forces. Yet, as the NYSED’s response to COVID-19 demonstrates,
single-purpose governance allowed for a more singular focus on key
educational requirements for distance learning and for school
reopening. The Regents and NYSED planning process and resulting
guidance for school reopening was not drawn into the political storm
that has accompanied the Governor’s and Mayor’s processes for
implementation. The Governor’s attempted overreach through his
reimagined education proposal provides a glimpse of what generalpurpose education might look like in New York. That perhaps
provides a strong argument for preserving New York’s anomalous
single-purpose structure.
CONCLUSION

If the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us anything, it is that
governance matters. Leadership matters. Facts and science matter.
Most of all, public health matters. And public education is crucial to
public health, the economy, and human dignity and potential. COVID19 also has demonstrated stark inequities in access to education, health
care, and economic well-being. Such inequities indicate a failure of
leadership and governance.
To address inequity and pursue equitable access to excellent
education, governance matters. In New York, mixed educational
governance models, a lack of understanding of school governance,
political battles over decision-making power, credit for success and
blame for failure, and the needs of multiple constituencies present a
complex system that is often difficult to navigate. That system
exemplifies several trends and tensions involving school governance
that have significant implications for the future, particularly as related
to privatization and the influence and interests of billionaires and
lobbyists on education policymaking.
The New York State Board of Regents’s decentralized, inclusive
governance model at the state level was carried out by an education
department independent of the Governor focused on education
fundamentals and necessary supports in planning school reopening. Its
approach to COVID-19 modeled an inclusive, fact-based, deliberative,
and pragmatic approach that considered the needs of a variety of
317. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2009) (noting the
increasing impact of wealthy interests on politics).
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schools and school districts across the State. By contrast, Governor
Andrew Cuomo sought to use his emergency powers to venture into
education policymaking.
His vision for reimagining schools
represented a top-down approach focused on the interests of the
wealthy and well-connected. Under the Governor’s general-purpose
vision, public education appears to operate in service to the broader
economic interests and opportunities, not as a valued public good in
itself. The Governor’s approach also strikes a more political tone.318
Of perhaps most concern is the degree to which the Governor’s
apparent push for a general-purpose, centralized school governance
regime under his purview would serve to smooth the way for private
interests to have a greater hand in dictating public education policy. At
the same time, COVID-19 reinvigorates questions about the
appropriate federal role and responsibility for ensuring safe and
equitable education access and whether education governance at every
level might be reconsidered.

318. This is particularly true regarding his interactions with Mayor de Blasio,
including numerous clashes about the COVID-19 response and school reopening
decisions related to it.

